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Tactics at Gettysburg 



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As Described by 
Participants in the Battle 



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COPYRIGHTE D BY A. T. g OWELL. 1910 

Gettysburg Compiler Print 






©CI,A268341; 



TACTICS AT GETTYSBURG 
As Described by Participants in the Battle. 

I. 

GEN. LEE'S PUEPOSE. 

"I think I can throw Gen. Hooker's army across the 
Potomac and draw troops from the South, embarrassing 
their plan of campaign in a measure, if I can do nothing 
more and have to return," wrote Gen. Kobert E. Lee to 
President Davis, of the Southern Confederacy, June 25, 
1863, describing in a single sentence the purpose of the 
Pennsylvania invasion that ended with the battle of 
Gettysburg. In his report of the Gettysburg campaign 
dated January, 1864, Gen. Lee thus referred to his ex- 
pectations : 

"If unable to attain the valuable results which might 
be expected to follow a brief advantage gained over the 
enemy in Maryland or Pennsylvania, it was hoped that 
we should at least so far disturb his plan for the sum- 
mer campaign as to prevent its execution during the sea- 
son of active operations." 

Col. A. L. Long, Gen. Lee's military biographer, says 
in his Memoirs of Gen. Lee: 

*'The object of the campaign being the defense of Eich- 

3 



moiid, Gen. Lee could either continue on the defensive 
and oppose the Federal advance, as he had recently done, 
or he might assume the offensive and by bold maneuver- 
ing oblige the Federal army to recede from its present 
line of operations to protect its capital or oppose the in- 
vasion of Maryland or Pennsylvania. The advance 
upon Richmond would thus be delayed, at least for a 
time. The dispirited condition of the Federal army 
since its late defeat and the high tone of that of the Con- 
federates inspired the adoption of the latter plan." 

"To defend Richmond by threatening Washington and 
Baltimore and Philadelphia was perhaps the most prom- 
ising purpose of the Confederate invasion," says Gen. 
John B, Gordon, "Eeminiscences of the CJivil War." 

Said Rev. James Power Smith, D.D., formerly A. D. 
C. to Gen. Ewell, in a paper read before the Massachu- 
setts Historical Society, April 4, 1905 : 

"The Commissary General at Richmond said, 'If Gen. 
Lee wants rations let him seek them in Pennsylvania.' 
Such an agressive movement would compel the Federal 
army to retire from the unassailable north bank of the 
Rappahannock, would remove the campaign from north- 
ern Virginia and give the country opportunity for recu- 
pei-ation. For at a time, at least, the Confederate forces 
would find supply in the abundance of the rich fields 
and barns of Pennsylvania. If a successful battle could 
be . fought on northern soil it might result in some 
o^iange of sentiment in the I^orth and a cry for peace; 
and it might bring recognition by foreign powers and a 
clof.e of the war. All things pointed to the invasion. 
Conditions compelled it and Gen. Lee, knowing the odds 



which were against him and the perils of the movement^ 
had the audacity to undertake it/' 

Lee formed his army into three corps, under the com- 
mand of Longstreet, Ewell and Hill, each corps com- 
prising three divisions. Having entrusted to the cav- 
alry the task of protecting the right flank of the army 
and the duty of observing the enemy, the Army of 
Northern Virginia in the latter part of June, 1863, was 
moved down the Shenandoah Valley toward the Poto- 
mac. Gen. Milroy's force of Federals was overwhelmed 
and nearly 4^000 prisoners were taken. The Potomac 
was crossed and the Confederates pushed on west of 
South Mountain into Pennsylvania. 

The danger that the North might sweep down and 
capture Richmond was not ignored, but it was not highly 
regarded. Indeed, Gen. Lee is credited with having re- 
marked that he wa? willing to ^^swap queen c"~exchange 
Eichmond for Washington. But this was a jocular re- 
mark, for the reports and orders of Gen. Lee fail to show 
that he had any designs on the Federal capital, or that 
lie believed the North would menace Richmond. On 
the contrary, he looked for a battle on northern soil, but 
he expected it would be on ground of his own selection, 
and that he would be enabled to act upon the defensive. 
His calculations in this respect were upset by the rash- 
ness of one of his own commanders, the rapidity of the 
uiovements of the northern army when it was learned 
that he was invading the North, and his ignorance of 
the whereabouts of the opposing forces, owing to the 
failure of the cavalry to keep him informed. For this 
Gen. Stuart has been unjustly blamed. Gen. Stuart 

5 



was authorized, June 22, to take position on Ewell's 
right and to collect supplies. Stuart failed to overtake 
Ewell because the latter was recalled from the Confeder- 
ate advance. Stuart left two of his brigades for Lee's 
use. 

"Lee, Longstreet and Stuart," says Col. Mosby, ("Stu- 
art's Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign"), "were all 
absent for the same reason on the first day — because the 
army had not been ordered to Gettysburg and it was not 
their duty to be there. They were in their proper 
places. Hill and Heth were not." 

Gen. Hooker, in command of the Army of the Poto- 
mac, meanwhile had been informed of Lee's movement. 
He ordered Gen. Slocum with the 12th Corps to Har- 
per's Ferry, with the intention of adding the 10,000 
troops in garrison there to Slocum's command. With 
this force Slocum was instructed to operate against the 
Confederate line of communications while the Army of 
the Potomac attacked in front. But Gen. Halleck, the 
commander-in-chief, refused Hooker's request that this 
garrison be placed at his disposal. Gen. Hooker there- 
upon resigned and Gen. Meade was appointed his suc- 
cessor. 

Gen. Meade did not know whether Lee's movement 
was limited to a raid into Pennsylvania, with the possi- 
ble capture of Harrisburg, or whether he aimed at Wash- 
ington and Baltimore. He was accordingly forced to 
proceed with caution. He was handicapped, too, by or- 
ders not to permit the enemy to get between him and 
Washington. Lee was unhampered by instructions, 
but he was ignorant of the whereabouts of his opponents. 

6 



The Army of the Potomac crossed the river on the 25th 
and 26th, but Lee did not learn it until the 27th. When 
news came to him that the advance of the Army of the 
Potomac had reached Frederick, Maryland, he ordered 
a concentration at Cashtown, Pennsylvania. 

He sent the following order to Gen. Ewell, command- 
ing the advance of the Confederate forces : 

Chambersburg, June 28, 1863, 7.30 a. m. 
Lieut. Gen. R. S. Ewell, 
Commdg. Corps. 
General : 

I wrote you last night stating that Gen. Hooker was 
reported to have crossed the Potomac and is advancing 
by way of Middletown, the head of his column being at 
that point in Frederick county. I directed you in that 
letter to move your forces to this point. I think it pre- 
ferable to keep on the east side of the mountains. 

R. E. Lee, Gen. 

Ewell had been ordered June 21 to take Harrisburg 
and was starting from Carlisle June 29, with that end in 
view, when he received orders to join the main body of 
the army at Cashtown. Early's division meanwhile had 
moved on a more southerly line to the Susquehanna 
river and was preparing to unite his forces with the rest 
of Ewell's Corps when he, too, was recalled to the main 
body. 

Meade on June 28, was no better informed of the lo- 
cation of Lee's forces than Lee was of the position of the 
Federal corps. He telegraphed that day to Gen. Hal- 
leck, commander-in-chief at Washington: 

7 



^'If he (Lee) is crossing the Susquehanna I shall rely 
upon Gen. Couch with his force holding him until I can 
fall upon his rear and give him battle." 

Two days later he telegraphed to Couch at Harris- 
burg : 

"We shall push to your relief. * * Can you keep 
the enemy from crossing the river?" 

Meanwhile Gen. John F. Reynolds, commanding the 
1st Corps, and the left wing of the Federal army, had 
been able to send to Gen. Meade a fairly definite state- 
ment of the position of the Confederate forces. Under 
date of June 29, 3.15 p. m., he Vvdred Gen. Butterfield, 
Meade's Chief of Staif : 

"Hopkins, a scout of Sharpe's has just returned from 
Gettysburg with a statement of the affairs in that quar- 
ter yesterday. Early's division passed there in the di- 
rection of York and the other division (Gordon's, I 
think) with the trains was in the valley and moved along 
a road nearer the mountains. Another division 
(Rodes') of Ewell's was up by Carlisle, and Hill (A. 
P.) was said to be moving up through Greencastle in the 
direction of Chambersburg. The cavalry with Early 
was sent off to Hanover Junction and up the railroad to 
York." 

On the following day, June 30, Meade issued the fol- 
lowing circular to his commanders: 

" The Commanding General has received information 
that the enemy are advancing probably in strong force 
on Gettysburg. It is the intention to hold this army 
pretty nearly in the position it now occupies until the 



8 



plans of the enem}' shall have been more fully develop- 
ed." 

By night Meade had received such information that 
he was convinced that all designs on the Susquehanna 



N 



nq-URELS I>E3ICtKKT? E\ 

Te-d^elfial Cop-PS 




Positions Morning July i . 



had been abandoned. For the next day's moves he or- 
dered the 1st and 11th Corps to Gettysburg, the 3rd to 
Emmitsburg, the 2nd to Taneytown, the 5th to Han- 
over, the 12th to Two Taverns, the 6th being left at Man- 

9 



ch«^ster, 34 miles from Gettysburg. These dispositions 
have been much criticised. By advancing his left Meade 
placed it between the converging forces of Hill and 
Ewell. 

Gen. 0. 0. Howard, who succeeded Gen. Eeynolds in 
command of the left wing of the Federal army, says in 
his autobiography (page 399, Vol. 1) : 

"On June 30 the Confederate Army formed a concave 
line (concavity toward us) embracing Chambersburg, 
Carlisle and York. Ours formed an indented line, ex- 
tending from Marsh Eun to Westminster, the left of 
that line being thrown far forward. If Lee could bring 
his men together east of the South Mountain near Cash- 
town it would appear that he might strike us in the flank, 
before we could assemble, blow after bow and beat us in 
detail." 

Meade had directed two of his corps to go to Gettys- 
burg as a covering movement, but followed up his in- 
structions with orders for a concentration on the line of 
Pipe Creek, fourteen miles south of Gettysburg, in case 
the enemy assumed the offensive. Gen. Meade's head- 
quarters were at Taneytown, ten milees south of Gttys- 
burg. 



II. 

BLTFORD'S UNTEN^ABLE POSITION. 

Pettigrew's Confederate brigade belonging to Hill's 
Corps, seeking army supplies, especially shoes, made its 

lO 



appearance in the western suburbs of Gettysburg about 
10 o'clock June 30, near the Lutheran Seminary and 
halted, while the oflBcers scanned the country with 
glasses. Learning of the Federal advance the brigade 
withdrew toward Cashtown, stationing pickets west of 
Gettysburg. At 11 o'clock two brigades of Buford's di- 
vision of Federal cavalry entered the town and moved 
out westerly on the Chambersburg pike or the Cashtown 
road. Buford soon discovered the proximity of the 
enemy, but, knowing that Gen, Reynolds was in support- 
ing distance with the 1st and 11th Corps, he decided to 
resist the Confederate advance and took position near 
the Seminary. 

^'By daylight on July 1," Gen. Buford's report, Au- 
gust 27, 1863, says : '^I had gained positive information 
of the enemy's position and movements and my arrange- 
ments were made for entertaining him until Gen. Rey- 
nolds could reach the scene." 

Gettysburg is about ten miles east of the South Moun- 
tain range. So many roads lead to it that it has been 
compared to the hub of a wheel. These converging 
roads are the Fairfield road from the south-west, the 
Chambersburg and Mummasburg roads from the north- 
west, the Carlisle from the north, the Heidlersburg or 
Harrisburg from the north-east, the York from the east, 
the Baltimore, Taneytown and the Emmitsburg roads 
from the south. 

Buford's decision was contrary to Meade's wishes as 
expressed in the following order : 



II 



Taneytown, Md., July 1, 1863. 
Gkn, Buford: 

Gkn : The Major General commanding directs me 
to order you to fall back to Taneytown and then to Mid- 
dleburg in case the enemy should advance in force upon 
you and press you hard. The cavalry will dispute every 
inch of the ground and fall back very slowly to the point 
designated and send in all information they can gathei'. 
By order of Maj Gen. Pleasanton. 

C. Ross Smith, 

Lieut. Col., etc. 

T^ee was just as desirous as Meade of avoiding action 
except on ground of his own selection. That day he no- 
tified Gen. J. D. Imboden as follows: 

"My headquarters for the present will be at Cashtown, 
east of the mountains." 

He had no thought of going to Gettysburg. In fact he 
toJd Gen, Anderson of Hill's Corps, that day at Cash- 
town that if the whole Federal army was in front of him 
"We must fight a battle here." 

Early on the morning of that day the outposts of the 
two armies came into collision on the ridge west of Get- 
tysburg, Lee's unexpected encounter with the Federal 
forces at Gettysburg, where he never had intended to 
fight, was brought about, Col. Mosby asserts in his "Stu- 
art's Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign," by the un- 
authorized precipitancy of Heth, aided and abetted by 
Hill, his corps commander. Heth's report says he went 
to Gettysburg on a reconnoissance, on learning from 
Pettigrew of the Federal advance. He should have re- 

12 



tired when he had developed the force in front of him. 
But he remained. Hill ordered more troops to him and 
the battle was brought on from which Lee felt he couW 
not retire. 

"The report on its face shows that he was not making 
a reconnoissance;' says Col. Mosby. "Two of his bri- 
gades had been shattered and a brigadier general cap- 
tured. But Hill, instead of winning expected tro- 
phies, had been worsted; he did not want to go back to 
camp and meet Gen. Lee with his plume torn and a 
black eye. So he ordered Pender in." 

It was "a premature movement contrary to the spirit, 
at least, of Lee's instructions," says James P. Smith, 
formerly A. D. C. to Gen. Ewell. "It made the great 
battle, not one of defense on the eastern slope? of Cash- 
town, but of oifense at Gettysburg." 

Lee's orders were to avoid bringing on an action, and 
that general's first intimation of danger of collision 
was his hearing Hill's guns at Gettysburg. He was 
much disturbed by it. But it was now too late to draw 
back and reinforcements were hurried forward. 'Tt was 
not by the choice of Lee nor by the foresight of Meadc,"^ 
says Smith, "that the Federal army found itself plae<?d 
upon lines of magnificent defense." 

"War is a business of positions," said Napoh.or The 
events of the day that followed proved the truth of the 
remark. Buford had imprudently seiz-d a position 
that was strong against an attack in front, but which 
could be easily turned by the forces he must have known 
were coming from the north and northeast. Of the 
seven corps of the Army of the Potomac only two, the 

13 



1st and 11th, were in supporting distance. The Con- 
federates could be reinforced much more readily than 
the Federal troops. Gettysburg itself was not worth 
fighting for. 

Col. Mosby says in his "Stuart's Cavalry in the Get- 
tysburg Campaign, (page 93) : 

"Gettysburg offered no offensive or defensive advant- 
ages. On the day before the battle the commander of 
neither army wanted to get possession of it, and either 
was willing for the other to have it and hold it. Meade, 
who had superceded Hooker, held it simply as a cavalry 
post ; Gen. Lee had no thought of going there. 

"Some writers have said it was a place of military 
importance because it was the center from which so 
many roads radiated. That was the very thing that 
made it weak and untenable. It was so easy to ap- 
proach it from any direction and turn it. An army on 
the Ridge had a tactical advantage in an attack on its 
front, but the attacking force had the choice of turning 
its flanks." 

In Col. Mosby's view that Gettysburg is a weak stra- 
tegic position Col. John H. Calef, a Federal officer, co- 
i!?i?ides. He says in "Gettysburg Notes. The Opening 
Gun" : 

"By a glance at the map it will be seen that from Get- 
tysburg as a center many roads radiate. * * Guard- 
ing those itading from Chambersburg and York the 
troops must be J'r'^posed on lines facing west and north, 
forming a salient order of battle, a very weak one, and 
which is open to the objections that the fire is eccentric; 
that the two faces are exposed to enfilade fire; that an 

14 



opening out at the angle presents the flanks to attack 
and the retreat of one wing compromises the safety of 
the other. That is precisely what happened and in the 
battle of this day each one of the objections noted re- 
ceived its illustration. * * Then again, each one of 
the many roads meeting at the town, like the spokes of a 
wheel, presented an avenue for outflanking. If the lines 
were deployed, covering all the approaches, they would 
be everywhere weak. If concentrated to guard the main 
roads, a flank would be presented as well as a conspicu- 
ous target for the opposing artillery." 

Had Eeynolds received Meade's order to withdraw to 
Pipe Creek on the morning of July 1, before starting 
for camp, no battle would have been fought at Gettys- 
burg. 

"When he reached Gettysburg," says Col. Mosby, '"he 
found Buford's cavalry engaged with Heth's division 
that was advancing on the pike from Cashtown. Bu- 
ford knew that Hill was at Cashtown and that Ewell was 
ten miles north at Heidlersburg the night before. He 
could not have expected to do more than hold the Con- 
federates in check. Instead of forming his line of bat- 
tle on Cemetery Ridge with Buford's cavalry on his 
flanks, Reynolds abandoned that strong position and 
moved two miles out on the Cashtown road with his in- 
fantry to join Buford. He then had Hill in his front 
and Ewell on his flank. The result of hi? t-dical error 
was a defeat for which he paid the pena^ '; of his life. 
His movement on the field perpetuates the memory of 
a heroic action and a great blunder." But it has been 
claimed that Reynolds would have retired to Cemetery 

15 



Hill had he not been killed. The Comte de Paris in his 
"Civil War in America" says, "One of Reynolds' aide de 
camp, Capt. Rosengarten, has even asserted that Rey- 
nolds had designated Cemetery Hill as the point which 
Howard was to occupy." 

Gen. Howard in his report to Gen. Meade, after tlie 
battle of July 1, said: 

"The position was not a good one, because both flanks 
were exposed and a heavy force approaching from the 
northern roads rendered it untenable." 

Artillery was promptly placed in position on both 
sides and exchanged shots. The fight had raged for 
over an hour when the Federal signal officer in the bel- 
fry of the Seminary, turning his eyes toward the Em- 
mitsburg road, saw in the distance the flag of the 1st 
Corps. Reynolds hurried up, and having surveyed the 
field, rode back to meet the 1st Corps and rush the 
troops forward to Buford's relief. He also sent word to 
G^n. Howard to bring up the 11th Corps from Emmits- 
burg. While leading forward in his impetuous manner 
the 19th Indiana of Meredith's Iron Brigade, General 
Reynolds received a fatal wound and fell from his horse. 
Gen. Doubleday took command. 

As the 1st Corps came up it replaced the cavalry who 
wero put on the flanks. 

Midway between the Fairfield and Chambersburs: 
roads wa^ a triangular piece of w^oods, the base resting 
on Willoug.by Run and the spur reaching up towards 
Seminary Ridge. ''These woods," says Gen. Doubleday, 
"possessed all the advantages of a redoubt, strengthen- 
ing the center of our lines, and enfilading the enemy's 

i6 



columns should tliey advance in the open space on either 
side. I deemed the extremity of the woods which ex- 
tended to the summit of the ridge, the key to the posi- 
tion." 

"It must be evident," says Samuel P. Bates (The Bat- 
tle of Gettysburg), "that the maneuvering of Doubleday 
was admirable and that it stamps him as a corps com- 
mander of consummate excellence. Where in the whole 
history of the late war is this skill and coolness of the 
commander, or this stubborn bravery of the troops 
matched?" 

Attacks by Davis and Archer^s Brigades of Heth's Di- 
vision were outflanked, and the Confederates lost consid- 
erably in prisoners. 

The fighting that ensued was as desperate as any in 
the Civil War. Col. Henry A. Morrow, Col. 24th Mich. 
A'ols., 1st Brig., 1st Corps, who was captured whik 
wounded, says in his report: 

"During the time I was a prisoner I conversed freely 
with distinguished rebel officers in relation to the bat- 
tle on the 1st instant and, without exception, they spoke 
in terms of admiration of the conduct of our troops, and 
especially of that of the troops composing the First 
Army Corps. One of them informed me that Lieut. 
Gen. A. P. Hill said he had never known the Federals to 
fight so well." 

Hon. C. D. Prescott, in an address to veterans of the 
97th N. Y. Vols., July 1, 1889, related this incident : 

"A Union horseman who charged wildly down the 
lines in a critical Juncture of the battle thundered what 
it meant to the northern soldiers. ^There are no troops 

17 



behind you. You stand alone between the rebel army 
and your homes. Fight like hell.' " 

The 76th New York lost 169 out of 27 officers and 348 
men. The 147 New York lost 207 out of 380 men in 
action. The 26th North Carolina regiment of Petti- 
grew's brigade had only 216 out of over 800 remaining 
when the fight closed. 

Lieut. Col. George Wagner, of the 88th Pennsylvania, 
has made the following estimate of the losses of the first 
day and a comparison with the losses of the other two 
days, showing that the percentage of casualties on each 
side was greater on the first day than on the other days : 



FEDERAL LOSSES. 



First day 
Other days 



Engaged. K. & W. Per Ct. Total Includ- 
17,000 4,823 28.3 51.2 ing miss 
66,000 12,905 19.5 21.6 ing 



Total engaged 83,000 17,727 21.3 27.7 22,990 



CONFEDERATE LOSSES. 



Engaged. K. & W. Per Ct. Total Includ- 
First day 30,000 7,001 23.3 28.6 ing miss 

Other days 39,000 8,297 21.2 30.4 ing 



Total engaged 69,000 15,298 21.7 29.6 20,448 
i8 



III. 

ROUT OF THE FEDERALS. 

Gen. Howard had in the meantime arrived in Gettys- 
burg in advance of his corps and examined the battle- 
field from an elevated position in the town. 

'^On hearing of the death of Gen. Reynolds (about 
11.30 a. m.)/' he says in his report, '^1 assumed com- 
mand of the left wing. * * After an examination 
of the general features of the country I came to the coa- 
elusion that the only tenable position for my limited 
force was the ridge to the southeast of Gettysburg, now 
so well known as Cemetery Ridge." 

But he did not order his forces t(^ Cemetery Hiil, al- 
though a lull in the fighting had come. He admits that 
there was a cessation of hostilities after the first attack 
of the Confederates was repulsed. He says in his auto- 
biography : 

"The temporary repulse of Cutler and the defeat of 
Archer and Davis had produced a feeling of caution on 
both sides so that there was a period of delay before any 
organized assault was again attempted." 

Gen. Abner Doubleday, who succeeded Gen. Reynolds 
in command of tlie 1st Corps, says in his "Gettysburg 
Made Plain": 

"Before the 11th Corps came up the enemy could have 
walked right o^'er the small force opposed to them, but, 
owing to the absence of Stuart's cavalry^ they had not 
been kept informed as to the movements Meade was 
making, and, fearing that the whole Union army was 

ic 



concentrated in their front, they were over-cautious. 
There was now a hill in the battle for about an hour." 

Gen. Doubleday continues: 

^*^Gen. Howard succeeded to the command of the field, 
but did not issue any orders to the 1st Corps until the 
afternoon. In the meantime Gen. Doubleday continued 
the contest, captured a great part of the forces that had 
assailed him and cleared his immediate front of all 
enemies." 

. Lieut. Col. Wm. F. Fox, 107th N. Y. Vols., says in 
"Few York at Gettysburg" : 

"The fighting ceased and for three hours (after 11 a. 
m.), there was a lull in the conflict. The success of the 
Union troops in repelling this opening attack made 
Heth cautious and he occupied the ensuing interval in 
bringing up his two other brigades, Pettigrew's and 
Brockenbrough's. During the two hours or more suc- 
ceeding the repulse of Heth there was no infantry fight- 
ing. Each side was preparing for a renewal of the con- 
test, Doubleday and his men disdaining to avail them- 
selves of this opportunity to effect a safe and honorable 
retreat." 

Gen. Doubleday says in his report : 

"Upon taking a retrospect of the field it might seem. 
in viev/ of the fact that we were finally forced to retreat, 
that this w^ould have been a proper time to retire; but 
to fall back without orders from the Commanding Gen- 
eral might have inflicted lasting disgrace upon the corps, 
and as Gen, Reynold?, who was high in the confidence of 
Gen. Meade had formed his lines to resist the entrance 



20 



of the enemy into Gettysburg, I naturally supposed that 
it was the intention to defend the place." 

After endeavoring to justify himself, he shifts the re- 
sponsibility to Gen. Howard. He continues in the fol- 
lowing words : 

"Nor could I have retreated without the full knowl- 
edge and approbation of Gen. Howard, who was my su- 
perior officer and who had now arrived on the field. Had I 
done so it would have uncovered the left flank of his 
corps. If circumstances required it, it was his place, 
not mine, to issue the order. Gen. Howard, from his 
commanding position on Cemetery Hill, could overlook 
all the enemy's movements as well as our own, and I, 
therefore, relied much upon his superior facilities for 
observation to give me timely warning of any unusual 
danger." 

In course of conversation with John Codman Eopes, 
the military critic, 38 years after the battle, Gen. Carl 
Schurz, who succeeded Gen. Howard in command of the 
11th Corps, asked him what was his criticism of the con- 
duct of the Federal troops. 

"He said," continues Gen. Schurz, in his Eeminiscen- 
ces, ''that on the wdiole we fought well and were obliged 
to yield the field north and east of the town, but that we 
committed a great mistake in not retreating to our sec- 
ond position south and east of Gettysburg an hour and 
perhaps two hours earlier." 

The Comte de Paris remarks: "If he (Howard) had 
not delayed so long in giving this order (to retreat) the 
retrograde movement in the presence of an enemy who 
had shown but little enterprise, could have been exe- 

21 



cuted without difficulty or any serious loss and conse- 
quentl}^ the position of Cemetery Hill could have been 
more strongly occupied." 

Says Samuel P, Bates: "Howard is without excuse 
for holding out so long." 

Howard halted Steinwehr's division, two brigades, on 
Cemetery Hill, as a reserve, and advanced Schurz and 
Barlow to the front. With these he formed line to 
cover the approaches as far east as Rock Creek. 

"This disposition was bad," says Col. E. P. Alexander 
in his "Military Memoirs." "The force was small for so 
long a line, and its right flank was in the air near the 
Heidi ersburg road, by which Early was now drawing 
near." 

"About 11.30," says Gen. Schurz in his "Reminiscen- 
06S," after describing the march of the 11th Corps from 
Emmitsburg, "I found Gen. Howard on an eminence 
east of the cemetery of Gettysburg, from which we could 
overlook a wide plain. * * From where we stood we 
o^jserved the thin lines of troops and here and there 
puffy clouds of white smoke on and around Seminary 
Ridge and heard the crackle of the musketry and the 
booming of the cannon, indicating a forward movement 
of our 1st Corps, which we knew to be a little over 
8,000 men strong. Of the troops themselves we could 
3oe little. * * Gen. Reynolds' death devolved the 
command of the 1st Corps upon Gen. Doubleday, the 
command of all the troops then on the field upon Gen. 
Ploward, and the command of the 11th Corps upon me. 

"ITie situation before us was doubtful. We received 
a report from Gen. Wadsworth, one of the division com- 

22 



manders of the 1st Corps, that he was advancing; that 
the enemy's forces in his front were apparently not very 
strong, but that he thought that the enemy was making 
a movement toward his right. From our point of ob- 
servation we could perceive but little of the strength of 
the enemy and Wadsworth's dispatch did not relieve our 
uncertainty. If the enemy before us was only in small 
force, then we had to push him as far as might seem 
prudent to Gen. Meade. But if the enemy was bring- 
ing on the whole or a large part of his army, which his 
movement toward Gen. Wadsworth's right might be held 
to indicate, then we had to look for a strong position in 
which to establish and maintain ourselves until rein- 
f(n-ced or ordered back. Such a position was easily 
found at the first glance. It was Cemetery Hill on 
which we then stood and which was to play so important 
a part in the battle to follow. Accordingly Gen. Howard 
ordered me to take the 1st and 3rd Divisions of the 11th 
Corps through the town and to place them on the right 
of the 1st Corps, while he would hold back the 2nd Di- 
A'ision under Gen. Steinwehr and the reserve artillery 
on Cemetery Hill and the eminence east of it as a re- 
serve. 

"About 12.30 the head of the column of the 11th 
Corps arrived. The weather being sultry, the men, who 
had marched several miles at a rapid pace, were stream- 
ing with perspiration and panting for breath. But they 
hurried through the town as best they could and were 
promptly deployed on the right of the 1st Corps. But 
the deployment could not be made as originally designed 
by simply prolonging the 1st Corps line, for in the mean- 

23 



time a strong Confederate force had arrived on the bat- 
tlefield on the right flank of the 1st Corps so that to 
confront it the 11th Corps had to deploy under fire at an 
angle with the 1st Corps. Gen, Schimmelfennig,tem- 
porarily commanding my (the 3rd) Division, connected 
with the 1st Corps on his left as well as he could under 
the circumstances and Gen. Francis Barlow, command- 
ing our 1st Division, formerly Devens', deployed on his 
right. * * Within the next two hours he (Barlow) 
made the mistake of being too brave. 

"I had hardly deployed with two divisions, about 
6,000 men, on the north side of Gettysburg, when the ac- 
tion very preceptibly changed in character. Until then 
the 1st Corps had been driving before it a comparatively 
small force of the enemy, taking many prisoners, among 
them the rebel General Archer, with almost his whole 
brigade. My line, too, advanced, but presently I re- 
ceived an order from Gen. Howard to halt where I was 
and to push forward only a strong line of skirmishers. 
This I did and my skirmishers, too, captured prisoners 
in considerable number. But then the enemy began to 
show greater strength and tenacity. He planted two 
batteries on a hillside, one above the other, opposite my 
left, enfilading part of the 1st Corps. Capt. Dilger, 
whose battery was attached to my 3rd Division, answered 
promptly, dismounting four of the enemy's guns, as we 
observed through our field glasses, and drove away two 
rebel regiments supporting them. In the meantime the 
infantry firing on my left and on the right of the 1st 
Corps grew much in volume. It became evident that 
the enemy's line had been heavily reinforced and was 

24 



pressing upoii us with a constantly increasing vigor. I 
went up to the roof of a house behind my skirmish line 
to get a better view of the situation and observed that 
my right and center were not only confronted by largely 
superior forces, but also that my right was becoming 
seriously overlapped. I had ordered Gen. Barlow to re- 
fuse his right wing, that is, to place his right brigade, 
Col. Grilsa's, a little in the right rear of his other brigade 
in order to use it against a possible flanking movement 
by the enemy. But I now noticed that Barlow, be it 
that he had misunderstood my order or that he was car- 
ried away by the ardor of the conflict, had advanced his 
whole line and lost connection with my 3rd Division on 
his left, and, in addition to this, he had, instead of re- 
fusing, pushed forward his right brigade so that it form- 
ed a projecting angle with the rest of the line. At 
the same time I saw the enemy emerging from the belt 
of woods on my right with one battery after another and 
one column of infantry after another, threatening to en- 
velop my right flank and cut me off from the town and 
the position on Cemetery Hill behind. 

"I immediately gave orders to the 3rd Division to re- 
establish its connection with the 1st, although this made 
still thinner a line already too thin, and hurried one 
staff officer after another to Gen.Howard with the urgent 
request for one of his reserve brigades to protect my right 
against the impending flank attack by the enemy. Our 
situation became critical. * * But before that Brigade 
came the enemy advanced to the attack along the whole 
line with great impetuosity. Gilsa's little brigade in 
its exposed position ^in the air' on Barlow's extreme 

25 



right had to suffer the first violent onset of the Confed- 
erates and was fairly crushed by the enemy rushing on 
from the front and both flanks. While I was doing my 
utmost, assisted by my staff officers, to rally and reform 
what was within my reach of the 1st Division for the 
purpose of checking the enemy's advance around my 
right and to hold the edge of the town the reserve bri- 
gade I had so urgently asked for, the 1st Brigade of the 
2nd Division, 11th Corps, under Col. Coster, at last ar- 
rived. It came too late for that offensive push which I 
had intended to make with it in order to relieve my 
right, if it had come half or even a quarter of an hour 
earlier. But I led it out of the town and ordered it to 
deploy on the right of the junction of the roads near the 
railway station which the enemy was fast ap23roaching. 
There the brigade, assisted by a battery, did good ser- 
vice in detaining the enemy long enough to permit the 
1st Division to enter the town without being seriously 
molested on its retreat." 

Gen. Howard appeared to be much concerned over his 
left flank, held by the 1st Corps, but little worried over 
his right, which was his vulnerable point. He went 
over to inspect the position of the 1st Corps about 2 
o'clock. He says in his autobiography (page 416) : 

"1 returned to my headquarters feeling exceeding 
anxious about the left flank. * * In order to relieve 
tiie threatened pressure against the 1st Corps and at the 
game time to occupy the enemy's attention, I ordered 
Schurz to push out a strong force from his front and 
siize a wooded height situated some distance north of 
Robinson's position, but the order had hardly left mo 

26 



when Major Howard brought me word that Early's Di- 
vision of Ewell's Corps was at hand; in fact, the entire 
corps w^as coming in from the north and east." 

The 140th N. Y. Vols, occupied the extreme right of 
the 1st Corps on the east slope of Oak Hill, to which 
Col. John E. Strang, commanding the regiment says it 
clung until support to the right and left was gone, when 
the regiment slowly retired, fighting as it went. Of 
330 in battle line, there were lost 194, nearly two-thirds. 
Col. Strang, in an address to the survivors of the regi- 
ment, September 4, 1888, said regarding the fight for 
the Mummasburg road, which ran between the 1st and 
11th Corps: 

"An open space of 300 yards or more still remained 
between the right of the 1st Corps and the left of the 
11th, perceiving which, part of Rodes' Division was 
massed for attack under shelter of the McLean build- 
ings and shrubbery north of the Mummasburg road. We 
had no reserve left to fill this gap and I was directed by 
Col. Prey to find the nearest brigade or division com- 
mander of the 11th Corps and represent to him the po- 
sition of affairs and the danger which was apparent that 
the enemy thus massing at McLean's would penetrate 
our lines through this opening which, if done in suffi- 
cient force, would immediately render the position of 
both corps untenable. I was unable to find either of 
those commanders, but delivered my message to a staff 
officer and the commanding officer of the nearest 11th 
Corps troops and then returned to the regiment. Be- 
fore reaching it, on looking back I saw that the right of 
the 11th Corps was rapidly being driven back and its 

27 



brigade nearest us was changing front to the right in 
order to protect its flank and line of retreat, instead of 
coming to our aid. The anticipated attack upon our 
right immediately took place and, being left without 
any protection on that flank, we were subjected to a 




COKFE.DE.'RATE. 



July I St about 3 P. M. 

murderous enfilading fire and obliged to fall back and 
change front to the right in order to protect our rear* 
The rebel advance from the west was also renewed with 
resistless numbers, Gen. A. P. Hill's Corps, comprising 
28 



about one-third of Lee's army, closing in upon the 1st 
Corps from that direction, while two divisions of EwelFs 
Corps assailed us from the north. We were slowly 
driven back to the town and through the streets and hav- 
ing been at the extreme right of the corps a good many 
of our men were cut off and captured before they could 
reach the town." 

Gamble's Brigade of cavalry, on the left flank of the 
1st Corps, offered a stubborn opposition to the advance 
of the Confederates. 

"Gamble lost heavily," Col. John H. Calef, U. S. A., 
says, "but the importance of the gallant stand made by 
this handful of dismounted troopers has never been prop- 
erly recognized, for had Lane reached the Emmitsburg 
road his position on the flank and rear of the 1st Corps 
would have seriously compromised the retrogade move- 
ment of that corps, then being executed, toward Ceme- 
tery Hill." 

Gen. Doubleday thus describes the retreat of the 1st 
Corps : 

"About 4 p. m. the enemy, having been strongly re- 
inforced, advanced in large numbers, everywhere deploy- 
ing into double and triple lines, overlapping our left for 
a third of a mile, pressing heavily upon our right and 
overwhelming our center. It was evident Lee's whole army 
was approaching. Our tired troops had been flghting 
desperately, some of them for six hours. They were 
thoroughly exhausted and Gen. Howard had no rein- 
forcements to give me. It became necessary to retreat. 
* * It is stated by Gen. Wadsworth in his official report 
that the portion of the 11th Corps nearest to us, unable to 

29 



stand the pressure, had fallen back some time before this 
and that our right flank was thus uncovered, so far as 
that Corps was concerned. * * When that part of 
the 11th Corps adjacent to us fell back, a force of 30,000 
men was thrown upon the 1st Corps, which in the be- 
ginning only contained about 8,200." 

The disaster to the Federal troops was brought about, 
as Gen. Schurz indicates, by Barlow's rashness in ad- 
vancing the right of the 11th Corps. 

Gen. Henry J. Hunt, in "Battles and Leaders," says 
that Doles, of Eodes' Division of Swell's Corps, had 
sent liis skirmishers forward to drive Devin's troopers 
from a hillock on Eock Creek, when Barlow advanced 
his division, attacked Doles' skirmishers and seized the 
knoll afterward known as Barlow's Knoll. The arrival 
of Gordon, of Early's Division, on Barlow's right 
brought an overwhelming force on his flank and he fell 
back, carrying back the whole line. 

Gen. J. A. Early says in his report (August 22, 1863) 
of the attack on Barlow's right that on arriving in sight 
of Gettysburg he found the enemy engaged in an at- 
tempt to drive hack Eodes' left. He continues : 

"Gordon was formed on the right. Hays in the center 
and Hoke on the left and Smith in rear of Hoke. Jones' 
artillery battalion was posted on the left of the Heidlers- 
burg road in front of Hoke's brigade. Gordon was or- 
dered forward to the support of Doles' Brigade on 
Eodes' left. The enemy had advanced to a wooded hill 
on west side of Eock Creek. After a short but hot con- 
test, Gordon routed the force opposed to him, and drove 
it back with great slaughter." 

30 



Gen. Gordon in his "Eeminiscences of the Civil War" 
thus describes the attack: 

"Eeturning from the banks of the Susquehanna and 
meeting at Gettysburg July 1, 1863, the advance of 
Lee's forces, my command was thrown quickly and 
squarely on the right flank of the Union army. * * 
With a ringing yell my command rushed upon the line 
posted to protect the Union right. Here occurred a 
hand to hand struggle. That protecting Union line 
once broken left my command not only on the right 
flank, but obliquely in rear of it. Any troops that were 
ever marshaled would under like conditions have been 
as surely and swiftly shattered. There was no alterna- 
tive for Howard's men except to break and fly or to 
throw down their arms and surrender. Under the con- 
centrated fire from front and flank the marvel is that 
any escaped. * * The whole of that portion of the 
Union army in my front was in inextricable confusion 
and in flight." 

"At 4.10 p. m.," says Gen. Howard's report, "on find- 
ing that I could hold out no longer and that the troops 
were already giving way, I sent a positive order to the 
commanders of the 1st and 11th Corps to fall back 
gradually, disputing every inch of the ground and to 
form near my position, the 11th Corps on the right and 
the 1st Corps on the left of the Baltimore pike." 

IV. 

LEE'S LOST OPPOETUNITY. 

Military students declare that Gen. Lee let a great op- 

31 



portunity slip when he failed to push the attack against 
the retreating Federals, though Gen. Ewell is held pri- 
marily responsible. 

Col. W. H. Taylor in his "Four Years With Lee/' 
says: 

"Gen. Lee witnessed the flight of the Federals through 
Gettysburg and up the hills beyond. He then directed 
me to go to Gen. Ewell and say to him that from the 
position which he occupied he could see the enemy re- 
treating over those hills without organization and in 
great confusion ; that it was only necessary to press those 
people in order to secure possession of the heights and 
that, if possible, he wished him to do this. * * Gen. 
Ewell did not express any objection or indicate the ex- 
istence of any impediment to the execution of the orders 
conveyed to him, but left the impression upon my mind 
that they would be executed." 

Gen. EwelFs report says: 

"On entering the town I received a message from the 
Commanding General to attack this hill if I could do so 
to advantage. I could not bring artillery to bear on it 
and all the troops with me were jaded by twelve hours' 
marching and fighting and I was notified that Gen. 
Johnson's Division (the only one of my corps that had 
not been engaged) was close to the town." 

Gen. Gordon, whose brigade had routed Barlow's Di- 
vision, says in his Memoirs : 

"In less than half an hour my troops would have 
swept up and over those hills, the possession of which 
was of such momentous consequence. It is not surpris- 
ing that with a full realization of the consequences of a 

32 



halt I should have refused at first to obey the order. 
Not until the third or fourth order of the most preemp- 
tory character reached me did I obey. * * It is stat- 
ed on the highest authority that Gen. Lee said some time 
before his death that if Jackson had been there he would 
have won in this battle a great and possibly decisive vic- 
tory. * * No soldier in a great crisis ever wished 
more ardently for a deliverer's hand than I wished for 
one hour of Jackson, when I was ordered to halt. Had 
he been there his quick eye would have caught a glance 
of the entire situation and, instead of halting mo, he 
would have urged me forward and have pressed the ad- 
vantage to the utmost, simply notifying Gen. Lee that 
the battle was on and that he had decided to occupy 
the heights. Had Gen. Lee himself been present, this 
would undoubtedly have been done." 

Early says in his report that he sent word to Hill that 
if he would send a division he would take the hill and 
he also told Ewell the same. He was told, he says, that 
Johnson was coming up and that it had been determined 
to take the wooded hill to the left of Cemetery Hill 
which it commanded. But Johnson arrived at a late 
hour, his movements having been delayed by a report of 
the enemy's advance on the York road. 

Eev. James Power Smith, D.D., formerly A. D. C. to 
Gen. Ewell, in a paper read before the Massachusetts 
Historical Society, April 4, 1905, said: 

"About 5 p. m. I rode with Gen. Ewell and staff into 
the town square of Gettysburg. * * It was a mo- 
ment of most critical importance, more evidently criti- 
cal to us now than it would seem to any one then. But 

33 



even then some of us who had served on Jackson's staff 
sat in a group in our saddles and one said sadly, '^Jack- 
son is not here.' Our corps commander, Gen. Ewell, as 
true a Confederate officer as ever went into battle, was 
simply waiting for orders when every moment of his 
time could not be balanced with gold. Gen. Early and 
Gen. Eodes' came with great earnestness and animation 
to tell of their advanced position (these men had gone 
on to the foot of the slopes of Cemetery Hill). They 
desired Gen. Lee to be informed that they could go for- 
ward and take Cemetery Hill if they were supported on 
their right ; that to the south of the cemetery there was 
in sight a position commanding it which should be taken 
at once and I was sent by Gen. Ewell to deliver the mes- 
sage to the Commanding General. * * Gen. Lee di- 
rected me to say to Gen. Ewell that he regretted that his 
people were not up to support him on his right, but he 
wished him to take Cemetery Hill if it were possible; 
and that he would ride over and see him very soon. 
Whatever the opportunity was^, it was lost. Early and 
Eodes were ready for the assault. A. P. Hill felt the 
losses in his command and waited for his third division, 
Anderson's; and Gen. Ewell, waiting for his third di- 
vision, Johnson's and diverted by the false alarm on his 
left, lacked initiative and looked for instructions from 
his commander." 

"The attack was not pressed that afternoon," said 
Gen. Lee in his report of July 31, 1863, "the enemy's 
force being unknown, and it being considered advisable 
to await the arrival of the rest of our troops." 



34 



Gen. Lee, in January, 1864, gave this further infor- 
mation : 

"Gen. Ewell was instructed to carry the hill occupied 
by the enemy if he found it practicable, but to avoid a 
general engagement until the arrival of the other di- 
visions of the army which were ordered to hasten for- 
ward." 

Col. A. L. Long, in his "Memoirs of Gen. Lee," speaks 
of the Federals having been reinforced. He says : 

"As the troops were evidently very much fatigued and 
somewhat disorganized by rapid marching and hard 
fighting, it seemed inadvisable to immediately pursue 
the advantage which had been gained, particularly as the 
retreating forces of the enemy were known to have been 
reinforced and to have taken a strong defensive position 
about a mile south of the town, * * Col. Long was 
directed to make a reconnoissance of the Federal posi- 
tion on Cemetery Ridge, to which strong line the re- 
treating troops had retired. This he did and found 
that the ridge was occupied in considerable force. On 
this fact being reported to Gen. Lee he decided to make 
no further advance that evening, but wait until morning 
before attempting to follow up his advantage. He 
turned to Longstreet and Hill, who were present, and 
said, ^Gentlemen, we will attack the enemy in the morn- 
ing as early as practicable.' In the conversation thstt 
succeeded he directed them to make the necessary prepa- 
rations and be ready for prompt action the next day." 

It is undeniable that the Federals were apprehensive 
of the result of a Confederate attack. Gen. Schurz tells 
in his autobiography of the fears entertained both by 

35 



himself and by Gen. Hancock, whom Gen. Meade had 
sent to the field on hearing of Gen. Reynold's death. 

Gen. Hancock said years after (January 17, 1878) : 

"In my opinion, if the Confederates had continued 
tlie pursuit of Gen. Howard on the afternoon of the first 
day of July at Gettysburg, they would have driven him 
over beyond Cemetery Hill." 

Brevet Maj. Gen. St. Clair Mulholland, 116 Pa., 2nd 
Corps, speaking of the time when Hancock arrived at 
Cemetery Hill, says: 

"At this moment our defeat seemed to be complete. 
Our troops were flowing through the streets of the town 
in great disorder, closely pursued by the Confederates, 
the retreat fast becoming a rout and in a very few min- 
utes the enemy wiuld have been in possession of Ceme- 
tery Hill, the key to the position, and the battle of Get- 
tysburg would have gone into history as a Confederate 
victory." 

Col. John B. Bachelder says: 

"There is no question but what a combined attack on 
Cemetery Hill within an hour would have been success- 
ful." 

Gen. Meade, himself, years after the battle, admitted 
that an attack in force by the Confederates would have 
resulted in a Federal defeat. In a letter to Col. G. G. 
Benedict, of Burlington, Vermont, March 16, 1870, he 
said: 

"Lieut. Gen. Ewell in a conversation held with me 
shortly after the war asked what would have been the 
effect if at 4 p. m. on the 1st, he had occupied Gulp's 
Hill and established batteries on it. I told him that, in 

36 



my judgment, in the condition of the 11th and 1st 
Corps with their morale affected by their withdrawal to 
Cemetery Eidge with the loss of over half their numbers 
in killed, wounded and missing, (of the 6,000 prisoners 
we lost in the field nearly all came from these corps 
in the first day) his occupation of Gulp's Hill with bat- 
teries commanding the whole of Cemetery Eidge would 
have produced the evacuation of that ridge and the with- 
drawal of the troops there by the Baltimore pike and 
Taneytown and Emmitsburg roads. He then informed 
me that at 4 p. m. on the 1st he had his corps, 20,000 
strong, in column of attack, and on the point of moving 
on Culp's Hill, which he saw unoccupied and com- 
manded Cemetery Eidge, when he received an order 
from Gen. Lee directing him to assume the defensive 
and not to advance ; that he sent to Gen. Lee, urging to 
be permitted to advance with his reserves, but the reply 
was a reiteration of the previous order. To my inquiry 
why Lee had restrained him he said our troops coming 
up (Slocum's) were visible and Lee was under the im- 
pression that the greater part of our army was on the 
ground and deemed it prudential to await the rest of 
his." 

The retreating soldiers were met at East Cemetery 
Hill by Gen. Hancock and Gen. Howard, who directed 
them to the various positions to which they had been as- 
signed. The 1st Corps was disposed on the left on 
Cemetery Eidge and Culp's Hill on the extreme right 
and the 11th on East Cemetery Hill around Steinwehr. 

In the meantime the 12th Corps was arriving on the 
Baltimore pike, and soon after Sickles' 3rd Corps was 

37 



seen coming up from Emmitsburg. Hancock had been 
instructed to take command and to report if he thought 
the ground suitable for fighting. Hancock on arriving 
established a battle line on the elevations southeast of 
Gettysburg. Geary's Division of the 12th Corps was 
ordered to occupy the ground to the extreme left to the 
right of and in advance of Hound Top. 

Hancock then sent word to Gen. Meade that the posi- 
tion was a very strong one, but that it might be easily 
turned. He surrendered the command to Slocum and 
returned to Taneytown to report in person. Both Slo- 
cum and Sickles had moved their corps on to Gettysburg 
without orders from Gen. Meade; in fact, in direct oppo- 
sition to instructions issued by him, having in mind the 
fornlation of the army along Pipe Creek. They exer- 
cised the discretion allowed in such cases and their ac- 
tion was afterward approved. 

Gen. Meade, without awaiting Hancock's return, 
acted on the information sent by him and decided to 
fight at Gettysburg. He sent order to his corps com- 
manders that as the battle would probably be fought 
there they must put their troops in motion and by forc- 
ed marches reach that place as soon as possible. Meade 
left Taneytown that night and arrived at Gettysburg at 
1 o'clock in the morning of July 2. The 2nd Corps 
(Hancock's) under the command of Gibbon, pressed on 
dlong the Taneytown road and was halted about three 
miles south of the town, where it passed the night. Five 
oif the seven corps of the arniy were on the field or in 
Supporting distance at nightfall. 

38 



THE FEDERAL LEFT TURNED. 

Regarding the decision to engage in battle the next 
da}', Gen. Lee says in his report of January, 1864 : 

"It had not been intended to fight a general battle at 
such a distance from our base unless attacked by the 
enemy, but, finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted 
by the Federal army, it became a matter of difficulty to 
withdraw through the mountains with our large trains. 
At the same time the country was unfavorable for col- 
lecting supplies while in the presence of the enemy's 
main bod}^, as he was enabled to restrain our foraging 
parties by occupying the passes of the mountain with 
regular and local troops. A battle thus became in a 
measure unavoidable. Encouraged by the successful 
issue of the engagement of the first day, and in view of 
the valuable results that would ensue from the defeat of 
the army of Gen. Meade, it was thought advisable to re- 
new the attack." 

The plan of battle he describes as follows: 

"It was determined to make the principal attack upon 
the enemy's left and endeavor to gain a position from 
which it was thought that our artillery could be brought 
to bear with effect. Longstreet was directed to place the 
divisions of McLaws and Hood on the right of Hill, par- 
tially enveloping the enemy's left which he was to drive 
in. Gen. Hill was ordered to threaten the enemy's cen- 
ter, to prevent reinforcements being drawn to either 
wing and co-operate with his right division in Long- 

39 



street's attack. Gen. Ewell was instructed to make a 
simultaneous demonstration upon the enemy's right to 
be converted into a real attack should opportunity offer." 

The valley in which the battle of the next day was 
fought seems fitted by nature for the scene of a great 
military contest. The western elevation extending 
south from the Seminary, has a fringe of trees. The 
eastern slope finally occupied by the Federal army was 
admirably adapted for awaiting an attack. Meade's 
final position is frequently spoken of as a fishhook, the 
barb being Gulp's Hill, Wolf's Hill further to the south- 
east forming the point. The stem runs along Geme- 
tery Eidge to the south ending in Little Eound Top and 
Round Top, the foot of the shank. The elevation of the 
former is 187 ft. The latter is 300 ft. high. The two 
Round Tops are not separated by a gap, but merely a de- 
pression. Their western slope descends to a marshy 
stream called Plum Run. West of the banks of Plum 
Run and opposite the Round Tops is an assemblage of 
boulders known as Devil's Den. 

The morning of July 2 was passed in anxious expec- 
tation by the men of both armies and in final prepara- 
tions. Gen. Meade looked for an attack in force on his 
right stationed on Gemetery Hill and Gulp's Hill. These 
are the points that would have been assailed had the at- 
tack been made the day before. This expectation led 
him to neglect his left, including the important posi- 
tions of the Round Tops. 

Gen. Lee planned a repetition of the concealed march 
and attack on the flank which was so successful at 
Ghancellorsville. The flank attack by Longstreet's 

40 



Corps was to be supported by Anderson's Division of 
Hill's Corps, lying parallel with the Emmitsburg road, 
each brigade to attack as soon as the brigade on its right 
engaged. 

In his plan Lee was unwittingly aided by the orders 
of the Union commander. Geary's Division of the 12th 
Corps had passed the night on the left. He was ordered 
to the right and went into position on Culp's Hill. Bu- 
ford's Division of cavalry had been temporarily station- 
ed on the left flank in front of the Round Tops, but Gen. 
Meade ordered it to Westminster to refit, having been 
erroneously informed that other cavalry had prepared 
to relieve him. 

^^The withdrawal of Buford's Cavalry Division to 
Westminster is one of the unexplained incidents of this 
battle," says Lieut. Col. Wm. F. Fox (New York at Get- 
tysburg). "That a division should be withdrawn 'to 
refit,' that it should be ordered thirty miles to the rear 
at the very moment when the enemy was forming in its 
front for an attack, cannot well escape the notice of 
thoughtful readers. The casualties in this division at 
Gettysburg aggregated 127, a loss which would hardly 
warrant withdrawal; and it had suffered no loss what- 
ever in equipment or horses. It was not needed to pro- 
tect Westminster, for Huey's fine brigade of cavalry had 
already been left behind at that place." 

One of the controversies of the Gettysburg battle has 
been over the alleged daylight order. It has been claim- 
ed that Longstreet was ordered to attack Meade's left at 
daylight of July 2. This Longstreet always denied. 
Col. A. L. Long in his "Memoirs of Gen. Lee," asserts 

41 



that Longstreet was distinctly ordered to attack at day- 
light and continues: 

"As the morning advanced surprise began to be felt at 
the delay in commencing the attack on the right which 
had been ordered to take place at an early hour. After 
giving Gen. Ewell instructions as to his part in the com- 
ing engagement he (Lee) proceeded to reconnoiter Cem- 
etery Eidge in person. * * Lee's impatience increased af- 
ter this reconnoissance and he proceeded in search of 
Longstreet, remarking in a tone of uneasiness, ^What 
can detain Longstreet? He ought to be in position 
now.' This was about 10 a. m. * * The opportu- 
nity which the early morning had presented was lost. 
The entire Army of the Potomac was before us." 

"As a matter of fact/' says Gen. E. P. Alexander in 
his "Military Memoirs of a Confederate/' "43 of the 51 
Federal brigades of infantry were upon the ground at 
8 a. m." 

"About 11 a. m. his (Lee's) orders were issued," says 
Gen Alexander. "Anderson's Division of Hill's Corps 
was directed to extend Hill's line upon Seminary Eidge 
to the right, while Longstreet with Hood's and Mc- 
Laws' Divisions should make a flank march to the right 
and pass beyond the enemy's flank which seemed to ex- 
tend along the Emmitsburg road. Forming then at 
right angles to this road, the attack was to sweep down 
the enemy's line from their left, being taken up succes- 
sively by the brigades of Anderson's Division as they 
were reached. Ewell's Corps, holding the extreme left, 
was to attack the enemy's right on hearing Longstreet's 
•guns. Longstreet was directed in his march to avoid 

42 



exposing it to the view of a Federal station on Little 
Eound Top Mountain." 

Sickles' 3rd Corps was stationed on the left of the 
2nd, which occupied Cemeter}^ Eidge. The left of the 
3rd Corps, the extreme left of the Union line, was in an 
unsatisfactory position. The corps' Chief of Artillery 
says in his official report that the positions of his bat- 
teries "were low. unprotected and commanded by the 
ridge along which was the road from Bmmitsburg," and 
that "there were no desirable positions on our part of 
the line." On the left was a screen of woods which the 
experience of the Union troops at Chancellorsville made 
a source of serious apprehension. Picket lines of the 
2nd and 1st Corps lay along the Bmmitsburg road. 
Sickles did not have force enough to occupy the Round 
Tops without leaving a wide gap in line between his 
forces and those of the 2nd Corps. 

From the left of the 2nd Corps to the Round Tops 
was 2,200 yards. As the front of the 2nd Corps covered 
only 1,200 yards, although that corps was larger than 
the 1st, Sickles felt that his corps could not adequately 
cover the ground from Hancock's left to the Round 
Tops. Meade, convinced that the attack would fall upon 
his right, did not think it necessary to strengthen his 
left and ignored the requests to that effect sent by 
Sickles. The latter believed that if he remained where 
he was the enemy would speedily occupy the Round 
Tops and be in a position to take the Union army in 
flank. 

He decided that the most practicable way out of his 
dilemma was to occupy the high ground in front of Lit- 

43 



tie Eoiind Top and extending from Devil's Den to the 
Emmitsburg road, forming at that spot a salient in a 
peach orchard. He hoped thus to be able to meet a 
flank attack with a battle line. A reconnoissance in 
force had disclosed three columns of infantry in motion 
on the Confederate right and confirmed him in his belief 
that the attack would be made on his left. 

"Had it not been for the activity of Sickles and the 
reconnoissance made by some of his troops/' says Lieut. 
Col. Fox, "Longstreet would have massed 17,000 men in 
the woods on the Union flank without their presence be- 
ing known. Longstreet's movement was a surprise to 
Gen. Meade, although information regarding it had been 
sent to headquarters. Meade paid little attention to his 
left until he found that it was attacked." 

The position in which Gen. Sickles placed the 3rd 
Corps has been the cause of more discussion prabably 
than any other feature of the battle except Pickett's 
charge the next day. Gen. Sickles has been censured on 
one hand for an error in judgment that cost many lives, 
and, on the other hand, he has been praised for an act 
that saved the Federal army from defeat. The former 
contention perhaps is best outlined in the words of Gen. 
Meade in a letter to Col. G. G. Benedict, March 16, 1870, 
in which he says: 

"My first orders to Gen. Sickles were to relieve the 
12th Corps division (Geary's) and occupy their posi- 
tion. * * When he came to my headquarters at 
about noon and said he did not know where to go I an- 
swered, ^Why, you were to relieve the 12th Corps.' He 
said they had no position; they were massed awaiting 

44 



events. Then it was I told him his right was to be 
Hancock's left, his left on Eound Top, which I pointed 
out. Now his right was three-quarters of a mile in 
front of Hancock's left and his left one-quarter of a mile 
in front of the base of Round Top, leaving that key 
point unoccupied, which ought to have been occupied 
by Longstreet before we could get there with the 5th 
Corps. Sickles' movement practically destroyed his en- 
tire corps, the 3rd, caused the loss of 50 per cent, in the 
5th Corps and very heavily damaged the 2nd Corps; as 
I said before, producing 66 per cent, of the loss of the 
whole battle, and with what result? — driving us back to 
the position he was ordered to hold originally." 

The defense of Gen. Sickles is given in a letter to the 
"ISTew York Times" in August, 1886, replying to the 
statements in Gen. Meade's letter. He says : 

"Gen. Meade nowhere pretends in his official report 
or in his testimony before the committee on the conduct 
of the war that I was to occupy Round Top. He states 
that he expected me to occupy Geary's position. Han- 
cock's report proves that Geary was ordered to the right 
of Round Top — precisely the gi-ound I held, extending 
my left to the Devil's Den and my right toward the Ern- 
mitsburg road. 

"Gen. Meade's statement, I repeat, is absurd, tacti- 
cally and topogi aphically, because it designates a line 
and position for the 3rd Corps which it could not have 
occupied by reason of the great extension of the line and 
the number of troops required to hold Round Top. * * 
Moreover, the direct line from Hancock's left to Round 
Top was a line through swale, morass, swamp, boulders, 

45 



and forest and tangled undergrowth, unfit for infantry, 
impracticable for artillery and hopelessly dominated by 
the ridge in front which I would have surrendered to 
Lee without a blow if I had attempted to execute the im- 
possible order Gen. Meade confidentially states to his 
correspondent that he gave me. Nay, more, if I had 
occupied the line Gen. Meade represents in 1870 that he 
told me to take I would have had no position whatever 
for my artillery and would have surrendered to Lee the 
positions for his artillery which he states in his official 
report it was the object of his movement to gain. In 
other words, the line indicated by Gen. Meade in his con- 
fidential letter is one that would have abandoned to the 
enemy all the vantage ground he sought and had to fight 
for all the afternoon. And this vantage ground, by 
which I mean the Emmitsburg road ridge, the Devil's 
Den, the Emmitsburg road itself and the intersecting 
roads leading to our left, once in the possession of the 
enemy without loss, would have enabled him to deliver 
his assault upon me in the position indicated by Gen. 
Meade three hours before it was delivered and with ad- 
vantage of position and force that would have given Lee 
the victory. 

"If the reinforcements which came up from 5 o'clock 
to 6.30 had arrived three hours before Longstreet's as- 
sault on the second would have been repulsed as prompt- 
ly and decisively as on the third day." 

Sickles did not feel confident that he could success- 
fully resist the attack, but he felt that he could hold his 
position until supports were brought up and defeat the 
enemy's attempt to outflank him. 

46 



Two-thirds of the corps wheeled south to meet the at- 
tack that soon came. Longstreet said in a letter writ- 
ten to Sickles many years after the war, Sept. 19, 1902 : 
"I believe that it is now conceded that the advanced po- 
sition at the peach orchard, taken by your corps and un- 
der your orders, saved that battlefield for the Union 
cause." 

Meanwhile Meade had been concerned about his right. 
He contemplated an attack upon the Confederates in 
that direction. At 9.30 a. m. he sent the following or- 
der to Gen. Slocum, commanding the 12th Corps: 

"The Commanding General desires that you will at 
once examine the ground on your front and give him 
your opinion as to the practicability of attacking the 
enemy in that quarter." 

This order he supplemented with the following : 

"Commanding Officer, 12th Corps: 

"The Commanding General desires you to make your 
arrangements for an attack from your front on the 
enemy to be made by the 12th Corps supported by the 
5th. He wishes this a strong and decisive attack which 
he will order as soon as he gets definite information of 
the approach of the 6th Corps which will be also directed 
to co-operate in this attack." 

To these orders Gen. Slocum at 10.30 a. m., replied as 
follows : 

Gen.: 

"Your note of 9.30 a. m. is received. I have already 
made a better examination of the position in my front 
than I am able to now that we have taken up the new line. 

47 



If it is true that the enemy are massing troops on our 
right I do not think we could detach enough troops for 
an attack to insure success. I do not think the ground 
in my front held by the enemy possesses any peculiar 
advantages for him. 

"H. W. Slocum, 

"Maj. Gen. Com." 

The contemplated attack was abandoned. 

At 3 o'clock^ just before the fighting opened, Gen. 
Meade telegraphed to Gen. Halleck, the Commander-in- 
Chief at Washington : 

"He (the enemy) has been moving on both my flanks 
apparently, but it is difficult to tell exactly his move- 
ments. I have delayed attacking to allow the 6th Corps 
and parts of other corps to reach this place and rest the 
men. Expecting a battle, I ordered all my trains to the 
rear. If not attacked and I can get any positive infor- 
mation of the position of the enemy which will justify 
me in so doing, I shall attack. If I find it hazardous 
to do so, or am satisfied the enemy is endeavoring to 
move to my rear and interpose between me and Wash- 
ington, I shall fall back to my supplies at Westminster." 

About 3 o'clock Longstreet's batteries opened along 
his entire line with an energy that indicated that an at- 
tack would soon follow. Gen. Meade went over to the 
left, where he expressed surprise at the advanced posi- 
tion of Sickles' Corps. It was too late to change it, and 
he promised to order up the 5th Corps to support his 
left, and instructed Sickles to call on Hancock for rein- 
forcements on his right. 

48 



"The position at the Peach Orchard/' says Bates, 
"was a commanding one for artillery and could the 
pieces have been protected by lunettes, as were those of 
Steinwehr, they could have defied the whole weight of 
opposing metal from left to right that was brought to 
bear upon them." 

"Had it (the peach orchard) been occupied soon and 
been well intrenched," says Fox, "it might have proved 
a still more serious obstacle to the enemy." 

The 3rd Corps was struck at the southern base of 
Devil's Den, and the attack then rolled up to the Peach 
Orchard and along the Emmitsburg road to Codori's. 

Col. Charlese H. Weygant, 124:th N. Y. Vols., which 
was stationed on the extreme left of the 3rd Corps, says : 

"Ward's Brigade formed the left wing of Birney's Di- 
vision and the 124th, after being moved about consider- 
ably, was ordered to form battle line on the rocky ridge 
at Devil's Den. When the battle opened there was noth- 
ing to our left but a section of Smith's battery, the re- 
maining guns of which were in position a short distance 
to our rear." Eeinforcement was slow, he charged. 
He continued : 

"That Sickles' entire corps fought most nobly and 
that Ward's Brigade was left unsupported and held its 
own for over an hour and a half in a most deadly contest 
with a force of the enemy which outnumbered it four to 
one, until its line of battle was reduced to a mere skele- 
ton and then, with the exception of one regiment, was 
not driven, but withdrawn, because there was no force 
at hand to prevent the enemy's moving past its flank 

49 



must be acknowledged by all honest writers who are ac- 
quainted with the facts." 




\ IAttack On 



Attack on Federal Left July 2. 

Maj. Samuel H. Leavitt, 86th N. Y. Vols., (also of 
Ward's Brigade), asserts: 

50 



^'We hung on grimly and maintained our ground un- 
til 5 p. m. The enemy had pressed the brigade back 
from the Devil's Den and attacked Round Top. Our 
left flank had been turned and we were forced to fall 
back, which we did in good order." 

The Confederates, however, claim that the resistance 
was briefer. 

"In less than an honr from the time we advanced to 
the attack," says Gen. Law in "Battles and Leaders," 
"the hill by Devil's Den, opposite the center, was taken 
with three pieces of the artillery that had occupied it." 

Col. A. L. Long, in his "Memoirs of Gen. Lee," thus 
describes the Confederate effort to capture Little Round 
Top: 

"Through an interval which lay between Sickles' left 
and the foot of Round Top, Hood's extreme right thrust 
itself unperceived by the Federals, and made a dash for 
Little Round Top, which through some strange over- 
sight was at this moment quite unoccupied by any por- 
tion of Meade's army. * * Yet it was the keypoint 
of that whole section of the battlefield and had Hood 
dreamed of its being unoccupied, pushed a powerful 
force in that direction and seized the commanding sum- 
mit, the victory would have been in his grasp since the 
possession of this point would not only have placed 
Sickles' Corps in a highly perilous position, but have 
enabled him to take the entire line in reverse. It was 
at this critical moment that the Federals discovered 
their error and hastened to amend it. The prompt en- 
ergy of a single officer, General Warren, chief engineer 

51 



of the army, rescued Meade's army from imminent 
peril." 

Gen. Hood does not deserve Col. Long's animadver- 
sion. Hood had sent some scouts up Big Eound Top 
who returned with the information that both Round 
Tops were unoccupied; that some of the Union wagon 
ti-ains were parked behind those hills and that he could 
march through open woodlands and level fields around 
Big Kound Top to where he could attack the enemy in 
flank or rear. Hood at once dispatched a staff officer 
to Longstreet with a message declaring that, in his 
opinion, it was unwise to attack up the Emmitsburg 
road and urgently requesting permission to pass to the 
south of Big Round Top and thereby turn the position. 
Longstreet returned word that Gen. Lee's orders were to 
attack up the Emmitsburg road. A second and third 
time Hood renewed his request to turn Round Top so 
til at he could attack the opposing forces in flank and 
rear, but each time he received the same reply. Long- 
street did not forward Hood's request to Gen. Lee be- 
cause he had already urged upon the Commanding Gen- 
eral the advisability of the same movement, but without 
success. He could not re-open the argument without 
appearing insubordinate. As a result, Gen. Lee was 
left in ignorance of the true position of the enemy's 
flank. 

Gen. John B. Hood, years after, wrote in his "Advance 
and Retreat": "After this urgent protest against en- 
tering into battle at Gettysburg according to instruc- 
tions—which protest is the first and only one I ever 



52 



made during my entire militar}^ career — I ordered my 
line to advance and make the assault." 

Gen. Warren, as has been indicated, noted the flank- 
ing movement of the Confederates and took measures to 
oppose it. He appealed to Gen. Sykes, of the 5th Corps, 
for men to occupy Little Eound Top. The orders 
reached Gen. Strong Vincent first and he ordered his 
brigade to the elevation. 

Lieut. 0. W. Norton, 83rd Pa., bearer of the brigade 
flag, and bugler for Gen. Vincent, says while Vincent 
was waiting for orders near the Weikert house an officer 
came galloping from the wheat field, who said, *^Gen. 
Sykes told me to direct Gen. Barnes to send one of his 
brigades to occupy that hill yonder." Gen. Vincent 
replied, "I will take the responsibility of taking my bri- 
gade there," and, ordering Col. Rice to follow as rap- 
idly as possible, he dashed at full speed for the hill. 

Hardly had the line been formed when it was attacked 
fiercely by Confederate regiments. But the latter re- 
ceived such a deadly fire that they recoiled and intrench- 
ed themselves at the foot of the slope. Another assault 
was made, but Hazlett's battery had been, by the great- 
est exertion, dragged into position on the summit, the 
drivers lashing the teams, forcing them up the steep 
slope with the heavy cannon. Col. O'Rorke's 140th 
New York regiment rushed up on one side of tlie hill as 
the Confederates ascended from the other. O'Horke 
leaped from his horse, drew his saber, and shouting to 
his men to follow, led the way down the rocky hillside. 
The regiment formed on Vincent's right. Meanwhile 
Hazlett's battery blazed forth with shrapnel and the 

53 



Confederate charge was again repulsed, and Little 
Eound Top was saved. Reinforcements came up and 
the danger was passed. 

The fighting on Little Eound Top was brought about 
not by the desire of the Confederates to obtain the hill, 
but by the Federal opposition to the Confederates' flank- 
ing movement. Had Little Eound Top not been occu- 
pied by the Federals, the Confederates would have push- 
ed over Plum Eun and joined in the attack on the left 
of the 3rd Corps. Little Eound Top was deemed of so 
little importance that not even a whole brigade was used 
by the Confederates in its attack. The marker on the 
field indicating the position of Law's Alabama Brigade 
of Hood's Division, the right of the Confederate line, 
reads as follows: 

"The 4th, 15th and 47th regiments attacked Little 
Eound Top and continued the assault until dark. The 
44th and 48th assisted in capturing Devil's Den and 
three guns of Smith's N. Y. battery. Present about 
1,.500. Losses about 550." 

In the inscription on the Warren monument no asser- 
tion is made that the Confederates sought to capture 
Little Round Top, but it is stated that the eminence was 
seized by the Federals to prevent Hood's flanking move- 
ment. It is true that the place is spoken of as the key 
to the Union position, but this phrase was an after- 
tlioiight. Able general that Lee was, he did not regard 
it of great value, Eather he looked upon the high 
ground west of Plum Eun, occupied by Sickles' 3rd 
Corps, as the key and that was the ground he aimed to 
seize In his official report he says, "Longstreet suc- 

54 



ceeded in getting possession of and holding the desired 
ground." 

The loss of the 3rd Corps' position, Brig. Gen, M. D. 
Hardin declared in an address at the dedication of the 
-ilst Pa. Regt. monnment, was due to the fact that the 
5th and 6th Corps were not brought up soon enough, 
the one to Sickles' support, the other to form a second 
line on the Little Round Top ridge. 

Reinforcements were sent to Sickles, but it has been 
repeatedly asserted they were not sent soon enough. 
They were sent, but in piecemeal. The large 1st Divi- 
sion of the 2nd Corps was ordered to support the 3rd 
Corps, but, according to Lieut. W. S. Shallenberger, 
140th Pa., who was in the division, "It was just 6 o'clock 
by the watch I carried when we crossed the corner of the 
wheat field, going into action." 

This was about three hours after the attack on the 
Federal left opened. 

The 5th Corps lay upon Powers' Hill the greater part 
of the day. 

Capt. Porter Farley, 140th N. Y. Vols., 5th Corps, in 
an address delivered years after on Little Round Top, 
said: 

"During the greater part of the remainder of that day 
we lay with the whole of our corps upon Powers' Hill, 
about a mile eastward from the spot where we now 
stand." 

Gen. Meade's official report declared that the superi- 
ority in numbers of the enemy enabled him to outflank 
the 3rd Corps and Gen. Birney was compelled to fall 
back, but it is asserted, on the other hand, that the num- 

55 



ber of Federals engaged on the left was fully equal to 
that of the Confederates, only the Federals were not all 
there at one time. They were beaten in detail. 




Sketch Showing Birney's Division. 

When the Confederate attack opened there were on 
the Federal side six brigades of the 3rd Corps, number- 

56 



ing 9,800 men. In the front were eight brigades of 
Confederates, numbering about 17,000. 

The division of the 2nd Corps sent to Sickles' aid 
pushed the Confederates back through the woods into 
the open fields south ; Brooke's Brigade reached the Rose 
farm, the furtherest point attained. The 64th New 
York of this brigade took 185 men and 19 officers into 
the fight and lost 98, including its colonel, a major, a 
captain and 4 lieutenants. The Peach Orchard was still 
held, but soon came a Confederate rush that captured it. 
Three brigades opposed one, and after a desperate re- 
sistance, in which the 141st Pa. Regt. lost 76 per cent, 
of its men, the Confederates seized the position. Ander- 
son's forces on the Emmitsburg road joined Longstreet 
in the attack. The Federal line at the wheat field was 
outflanked. A battalion of artillery followed fast on 
Barksdale's charging Mississippians and seventeen guns 
were planted on the high ground abandoned by the Fed- 
eral troops. Gen. Sickles was wounded and Gen. Bir- 
ney took command. Federal reinforcements were push- 
ed forward, but they were whipped in detail. The re- 
sistless wave of the Confederates, Longstreet's Corps and 
Anderson's Division, now united, swept across Plum 
Run. 

Wilcox's Alabama Brigade forced its way to the Fed- 
eral line on Cemetery Ridge, striking a point which had 
been divested of troops through calls for reinforcements. 
Hancock discerned through the smoke the dangerous 
proximity of the enemy's red flags. He ordered the 1st 
Minnesota regiment to attack them. This regiment 
drove Wilcox back, capturing the colors of the leading 

57 



regiment. But it was only after tlie regiment had sus- 
tained the heaviest loss suffered by any regiment during 
the war, and, it might be said, in history. 

Harper's Weekly, in speaking of this charge, said: 

"The charge saved the day, but 82 per cent, of the 
men who made the charge were left on the field. N^early 
every officer was dead or mortally wounded. Of 262 
men who made the charge 215 were shot down by the 
bullets of the enemy; 47 were still in line." Ex-Pen- 
sion Commissioner Lochren, one of the survivors, says 
of it, "The annals of war contain no parallel to this 
charge. In its desperate valor, complete execution, suc- 
cessful result and its sacrifice of men in proportion to 
the number engaged, authentic history has no record 
with which it can be compared." 

Wright's Georgia Brigade, on the left of Wilcox, ad- 
vancing past the Codori house, on the Emmitsburg road, 
penetrated to the battery posted in front of an angle 
formed in the stone wall on Cemetery Ridge, used by 
the Federal troops for breastworks. The Confederates 
charged up the ridge to a point where they could look 
down on the eastern side. But Hancock's 2nd Corps 
rallied and drove them back. Wright captured and had 
temporary possession of eighteen cannon, but, for lack 
of support, Avas obliged to abandon them. Attacked 
front and flank, the Georgians faced about and fought 
their way back in the gloom of the twilight to the Em- 
mitsburg road. Wright remarked the next day when 
Pickett's contemplated charge over exactly the same 
ground was being discussed: "It's not so hard as it 
looks to get there, the thing is to stay." 

58 



Wright's action closed Longstreet's battle of the after- 
noon. 

Gen. Alexander says in his "Memoirs of a Confeder- 
ate" regarding the failure of the Confederate attack: 

"Three of Anderson's five brigades had attacked in 
progressive order and in single lines. They had been 
defated and driven back, one at a time, in the order of 
their advance. No better demonstration could be asked 
of the evils of progressive attacks. The three brigades 
could just as easily have attacked simultaneously with 
McLaws, and several other brigades of Hill's Corps 
could have supported and advanced with them. The 
temporary success of each brigade in a single and iso- 
lated line puts it beyond doubt that such an attack would 
have had better result." 

About the time that Wright was being driven back 
Crawford's Division of Pennsylvania Reserves charged 
down the western slope of Little Round Top, and drove 
the Confederates out of the valley of Plum Run into the 
woods around Devil's Den and the wheat field. Part of 
the 6th Corps that had arrived in the afternoon rendered 
efficient service in thrusting back the enemy's lines. 
When fighting ended for the day the Federal line in- 
cluded the two Round Tops and the wheat field and a 
strong picket line on the Emmitsburg road. All the 
Federal guns that had been captured during the day 
were retaken but four. Some of Longstreet's troops re- 
mained in Devil's Den and held the line of the Emmits- 
burg road at the Peach Orchard. 

"From these positions," says Gen. Alexander, "the 
firing was kept up until darkness brought a welcome 

59 



end. For in our worn out and isolated position we were 
in a very dangerous situation. Had Meade now ordered 
an advance he would have found Longstreet's left flank 
in the air and the whole of McLaws' and Hood's Divi- 
sions much exhausted and but poorly supplied with am- 
munition. The ground on the left was open and the 
moon was full. There was certainly a great opportu- 
nity offered the Federal commander with his large force 
of fresh troops in hand near the field and only needing 
the word to go." 

VI. 

ATTACK ON THE FEDERAL RIGHT. 

But, although fighting on the Federal left had ceased, 
a battle was raging on the Federal right. The fighting 
was not surpassed in fierceness by any that day and the 
Confederates came near success. Ewell, commanding 
Lee's left, had been ordered to attack the Federal right 
when he heard Longstreet's guns down in front of the 
Round Tops. Assaults were to be made on Culp's and 
Cemetery Hills. The sun had gone down when the Con- 
federate infantry moved against Culp's Hill. 

"Johnson's Division, which was to attack Culp's Hill, 
had not been pushed close to the hill in preparation for 
tVte assault, although one had been contemplated all 
day," says Gen. Alexander. "It had a mile to advance 
and Rock Creek had to be crossed. This could be done 
at only a few places and involved much delay. Gen. 
Johnson's report states that it was dark when the foot 
of the mountain was reached." 

60 



The "Stonewall" Brigade encountered Federal cav- 
alry east of Gulp's Hill as it was moving to position and 
was delayed so long that it could not take part in the as- 
sault. 

The entire 12th Corps had gone over to assist the 
left, only Greene's Brigade being left to defend the earth- 
works. Meade, at first wholly concerned about his right, 
later wanted to strip it entirely to reinforce his left, but 
was dissuaded by Slocum. 

Meade's action "seems the more inexplicable," sj^ys 
Bates, "inasmuch as the 6th Corps, the strongest in the 
whole army had arrived on the ground at 2 p. m., two 
full hours before the fighting for the day had commenced 
and it was neither used to reinforce the left until the 
fighting had nearly ceased nor was it put into the breast- 
works upon the right to supply the place made vacant 
by the withdrawal of the 12th. A worse blunder could 
not have been committed." 

Greene's Brigade formed one man deep, behind the ex- 
tended breastworks, stopped the Confederate advance. 
Seven regiments, numbering only about 800 men, were 
sent to reinforce Greene. It was after midnight when 
the Confederates gave up the attempt. One Confeder- 
ate brigade seized a line of abandoned breastworks 
thrown up by the 12th Corps and pushed forward to 
within 400 yards of the Baltimore pike, where were the 
Federal supply trains and reserve artillery. 

When the sound of musketry on Gulp's Hill was heard 
two of Early's brigades, under command of Gen. Hay^, 
advanced to the assault on the east side of Cemetery 
Hill. Rodes' Division had been ordered to attack at 

6i 



the same time the west front. It was about 8 o'clock 
when Early's brigades advanced. They had only about 
500 yards to go on leaving the streets of Gettysburg. 



muam 



fllipillliilllllllli 



j^LeVCNTH 






July 2 Federal Right. 

The Federal artillery fire being high, did not check 
them. The infantry at the base of the hill were easily 
dislodged. As the Confederates swept up the slope the 
batteries on the crest opened with canister, but, owing 
to the darkness and smoke and inability to depress the 
guns sufficiently, the assaulting force suffered little. It 
rushed in among the guns. The cannoneers, assisted by 
the drivers, defended their guns with rammers, hand- 

62 



spikes and every weapon at hand. From all sides the 
infantry of the 11th Corps rushed to save the guns. 
Rodes' Division had failed to attack on the west front 
of Cemetery Hill; and the Federal troops there were free 
to come to the aid of the 11th Corps on East Cemetery 
Hill. Carroll's Brigade of the 2nd Corps was rushed 
to the spot, and the assailants were forced down the hill. 

Gen. Hays says of the attack in his report of August 
3, 1863: 

"A little before 8 p. m. I was ordered to advance with 
my own and Hoke's Brigade on my left, which had been 
placed for the time under my command. I immediately 
moved forward and had gone but a short distance when 
my whole line became exposed to a most terrific fire from 
the enemy's batteries from the entire range of hills in 
front and to the» right and left; still both brigades ad- 
vanced steadily up and over the first hill and into a bot- 
tom at the foot of Cemetery Hill. Here we came upon 
a considerable body of the enemy and a brisk musketry 
fire ensued; at the same time his artillery, of which we 
were now within canister range, opened upon us, but, 
owing to the darkness of the evening, now verging into 
night, and the deep obscurity afforded by the smoke of 
the firing, our exact locality could not be discovered by 
the enemy's gunners ,and we thus escaped what in the 
full light of day could have been nothing else than hor- 
rible slaughter. Taking advantage of this, we continu- 
ed to move forward until we reached the second line be- 
hind a stone wall at the foot of a fortified hill. We 
passed such of the enemy who had not fled and who were 
still clinging for shelter to the wall to the rear as prison- 

63 



ers. Still advancing, we came iipiin an abatis of fallen 
timber and the third line disposed in rifle pits. This 
line we broke and, as before, found many of the enemy 
who had not fled hiding in the pits for protection. These 
I ordered to the rear as prisoners and continued my prog- 
ress to the crest of the hill. Arriving at the summit, 
by a simultaneous rush from my whole line I captured 
several pieces of artillery, four stands of colors and a 
number of prisoners. At that time every piece of artil- 
lery which had been firing upon us was silenced. A 
quiet of several minutes now ensued. Their heavy 
masses of infantry were heard and perfectly discerned 
through the increasing darkness advancing in the direc- 
tion of my position. Approaching within 120 yards a line 
was discovered before us from the whole length of which 
a simultaneous fire was delivered. I reserved my fire 
from the uncertainty of this being a force of the enemy 
or of our men, as I had been cautioned to expect friends 
both in front, to the rght and to the left, but after the 
delivery of a second and third volley the flashing of the 
musketry disclosed the still advancing line to be that of 
the enemy. I then gave the order to fire. The enemy 
was checked for a time, but, discovering another line 
moving up in rear of this one and still another force in 
rear of that, and being beyond the reach of support, I 
gave the order to retire to the stone wall at the foot of 
the hill." 

Kodes gave afterward as his reason for not attacking 
that he had much further to go to get into position than 
Early's men, and that when he was ready to attack 
Early had withdrawn. 

64 



That night Meade's corps commanders in council 
unanimously voted to stay and fight it out. The result 
of the day's fighting was satisfactory. 

In the night the Federal right on Gulp's Hill was 
strengthened by the return of the 12th Corps and plans 
were made to drive out the Confederates who occupied 
the vacated intrenchments. Promptly at daybreak 
(about 3.30 o'clock) the artillery of the 12th Corps 
opened fire. The Confederates were already in line and 
were preparing to resume the attack begun the night be- 
fore. The artillery fire was only a preliminary to the 
infantry attack by the 12th Corps, which immediately 
followed. The Confederates opened fire and advanced 
at the same time. The Confederates had also been 
strengthened in the night. Their force numbered about 
9,600, those opposed to them about 11,200. The efforts 
of the Confederates were directed toward gaining pos- 
session of the Baltimore pike. The firing was close and 
deadly. The expenditure of ammunition was enormous. 
The 145th New York fired 150 rounds per man. The 
27th Indiana and the 2nd Massachusetts regiments made 
a spirited charge upon the Confederates concealed be- 
hind breastworks in the woods, and in a few minutes lost 
24:6 men of the 659 taken into action. A number of 
Confederate Sharpshooters concealed in the Tawney 
house across Eock Creek, which flows just east of Culp's 
Hill, annoyed the Federal troops considerably for a time, 
but a few shells rendered the house untenable. 

The men of Geary's Division who during all these 
hours, for the fighting had been going on for hours, had 
been watching for the proper opportunity, noted the 

65 



failure of the Confederate assault, and springing for- 
ward with loud cheers, followed up their advantage. 
The whole line pushed ahead and drove the Confederates 
out of the Federal works. At 11 a. m. the 12th Corps 
was in full possession of its original line. The Confed- 
erates withdrew to Eock Creek. 

For nearly eight hours the unremitting roar of the 
rifle had continued along the front of the 12th Corps, 
varied at times by heavier crashes where some fresh regi- 
ment, relieving another, opened with a full volley. x4s 
fast as regiments expended their ammunition they were 
relieved, went to the rear, cleaned their rifles, refilled 
their cartridge boxes and resumed their place in line. 
It was the longest continuous fight of any made at Get- 
tysburg. 

VI. 

ATTACK ON THE FEDERAL CENTER. 

Meanwhile everything was quiet in the center and the 
left of the Federal line. The men rested idly, listening 
to the roar of the conflict on Culp's Hill. Gen. Meade 
had made his left secure. There was no inducement 
for the Confederates to attack there. They had been re- 
pulsed on the Federal right. Only the center was left 
if another assault was to be made. Encouraged by the 
success attending Wright's attack with his unsupported 
Georgia Brigade, Gen. Lee selected the same point for 
another attack, but one to be made by a strong column 
with ample artillery support. Gen. Longstreet endeav- 
ored to disvsuade his chief from any other offensive move- 

66 



ment. He urged that Lee should move his army around 
Meade's left flank and by passing to the south of Round 
Top force him to vacate his strong position at Gettys- 
burg. Such a movement would menace Meade's com- 
munications with Washington and even threaten the 
national capital. Such a movement, as has been shown 
by Meade's dispatch to Halleck, would have forced him 
from his position. But the Confederate commander was 
bent on making another attack and listened with impa- 
tience. 

Commenting on the result of the fighting of July 2, 
Gen. Lee says regarding his plans for the next day in 
his report of January, 1864: 

"The result of this day's operations induced the belief 
that with proper concert of action and with the increased 
support that the positions gained on the right would en- 
able the artillery to render the assaulting force we should 
ultimately succeeed, and it was accordingly determined 
to continue the attack. The general plan was unchanged. 
Longstreet, reinforced by Pickett's three brigades which 
arrived near the battlefield during the afternoon of the 
2nd, was ordered to attack the next morning, and Gen. 
Ewell was directed to assail the enemy's right at the 
same time. The latter, during the night, reinforced by 
Gen. Johnson with two brigades from Kodes' and one 
from Early's Division, 

"Gen. Longstreet's dispositions were not completed as 
early as was expected, but before notice could be sent to 
Gen. Ewell Gen. Johnson had already become engaged 
and it was too late to recall him. * * The projected 
attack on the enemy's left not having been made, he 

67 



(the enemy) was enabled to hold his right with a force 
largely superior to that of Gen. Johnson and finally to 
threaten his flank and rear, rendering it necessary for 
him to retire to his original position about 1 p. m. 

"Gen. Longstreet was delayed by a force occupying the 
high, rocky hills on the enemy's extreme left, from 
which his troops could be attacked in reverse as they ad- 
yanced. His operations had been embarrassed the day 
pievious by the same cause and he now deemed it neces- 
sary to defend his flank and rear with the divisions of 
Hood and McLaws. He was, therefore, reinforced by 
Heth's Division and two brigades of Pender's, to the 
command of which Maj. Gen. Trimble was assigned. 
Gen. Hill was directed to hold his line with the rest of 
his command, afford Gen. Longstreet further assistance, 
if required, and avail himself of any success that might 
be gained. 

"A careful examination was made of the ground se- 
cuj-ed by Longstreet and his batteriees placed in posi- 
tions which, it was believed, would enable them to si- 
lence those of the enemy. Hill's artillery and part of 
Ewell's was ordered to open simultaneously and the as- 
saulting column to advance under cover of the combined 
fire of the three. The batteries were directed to be 
pushed forward as the infantry progressed, protect their 
flanks and support their attacks closely." 

Continuing the narrative of the attack. Gen. James 
Longstreet says in his report of July 27, 1863 : 

"The Commanding General joined me and ordered a 
column of attack to be formed of Pickett's, Heth's and 
part of Pender's divisions, the assault to be made di- 

68 



rectly at the enemy's main position, the Cemetery Hill. 
* * Orders were given by Maj. Gen. Pickett to form 
his line under the best cover that he could get from the 
enemy's batteries and so that the center of the assaulting 
column would arrive at the salient of the enemy's posi- 
tion, Gen. Pickett's line to be the guide and to attack 
the line of the enemy's defenses, and Gen. Pettigrew, in 
command of Heth's Division, moving on the same line 
as Gen. Pickett, was to assault the salient at the same 
moment. Pickett's Division was arranged, two brigades 
in the front line, supported by his third brigade, and 
Wilcox's Brigade was ordered to move in rear of his 
right flank to protect it from any force that the enemy 
might attempt to move against it. 

^'Heth's Division, under command of Brig. Gen. Pet- 
tigrew, was arranged in two lines, and these supported 
by part of Maj. Gen. Pender's Division, under Maj. Gen. 
Trimble." 

Gen. Lee's plan was for the assaulting column to ad- 
vance under cover of the combined fire of the artillery 
of the three Confederate corps. The plan was not car- 
ried out. The Confederate artillery was engaged for 
an hour before the assaulting column advanced from the 
woods on Seminary Ridge. Then the ammunition was 
so depleted that proper support could not be given to 
the advance. 

Lieut. Col. Robt. M. Strebling says in "The Gettys- 
burg Campaign," referring to Pickett's repulse : 

" Instead of close co-operation between the two arms 
of the service, as was ordered, the battle was divided 
into two separate and distinct parts — the first fought by 

69 



artillery without any infantry and the second by in- 
fantry without any artillery." 

Gen. Longstreet apparently did not fully grasp Gen. 
lice's plan. Instead of an attack by infantry supported 
by the fire of artillery, he judged that the demoraliza- 
tion of the enemy by a cannonading was intended. In 
a note to Col. E. P. Alexander, in command of the ar- 
tillery on the extreme right, from which position the 
bent view of the Federal line could be gained, he wrote : 

"Colonel: If the artillery fire does not have the ef- 
fect to drive off the enemy or greatly demoralize him so 
as to make our effort pretty certain, I would prefer that 
you should not advise Pickett to make the charge. I 
sJiall rely a great deal upon your judgment to determine 
the matter and shall expect you to let Gen. Pickett know 
when the moment offers." 

in an explanatory note, sent shortly after to Col. Alex- 
ander, Gen. Longstreet said: 

"The intention is to advance the infantry if the artil- 
lery has the desired effect of driving the enemy's off, or 
having other effect such as to warrant us in making the 
attack. When that moment arrives advise Gen. Pick- 
ett, and, of course, advance such artillery as you can use 
in aiding the attack." 
. To this Col, Alexander replied : 

"General: When our fire is at its best I will advise 
God. Pickett to advance." 

The artillery firing was begun by the Confederates at 
exactly 1 p. m., 172 guns taking part. It is estimated 
that 220 guns replied from the Federal lines. Col. 
Alexander waited in vain for a favorable development, 

70 



but he dared not presume on using more than an hour's 
ammunition and judging that it would take Pickett half 
an hour to get to close quarters with the Federals after 
the notice was sent to him Col. Alexander dispatched the 
following note at 1.25 p. m. to Pickett: 

"General: If you are to advance at all you must 
come at once or we will not be able to support you as we 
ought. But the enemy's fire has not slackened materi- 
ally and there are still 18 guns firing from the ceme- 
tery." 

Col. Alexander had been erroneously informed that 
the objective point, a clump of trees, was the cemetery. 
Fifteen minutes later, Pickett's men not having emerged 
from the woods. Col. Alexander sent the following ur- 
gent appeal: 

"For God's sake, come quick. The 18 guns have gone. 
Come quick or my ammunition will not let me support 
you properly." 

Pickett thereupon rode to Longstreet's quarters. "As 
he came up," says Gen. Longstreet (Lee's Eight Wing 
at Gettysburg, Battles and Leaders) "he asked if the 
time for his advance had come. I was convinced that 
he would be leading his troops to needless slaughter and 
did not speak. He repeated the question and without 
opening my lips I bowed in answer. In a determined 
voice Pickett said, ^Sir, I shall lead my division for- 
ward.' He then remounted his horse and rode back to 
his command. * * Col. Alexander had set aside a 
battery of seven guns to advance with Pickett, but Gen. 
Pendleton, from whom they were borrowed, recalled 
them just before the charge was ordered. Col. Alexan- 

71 



der told me of the seven guns which had been removed 
and that his ammunition was so low he could not prop- 
erly support the charge. I ordered him to stop Pickett 
until the ammunition could be replenished and he an- 
swered, ^There is no ammunition with which to replen- 
ish.' In the hurry he got together such guns as he 
could to move with Pickett." 

Col. Alexander says in his Memoirs regarding Long- 
street's anticipations of failure: 

"Yet even he could have scarcely realized until the 
event showed how entirely unprepared were Hill and 
Ewell to render aid to his assault and to take prompt ad- 
vantage of even temporary success. None of their guns 
had been posted with a view to co-operative fire nor to 
follow the charge, and much of their ammunition had 
been wasted. And, although Pickett's assault, when 
made, actually carried the enemy's guns, nowhere was 
there the slightest preparation to come to his assistance. 
The burden of the whole task fell upon the ten brigades 
employed. The other 27 brigades and 56 fresh guns 
were but widely scattered spectators." 

Six brigades were in the first line, estimated at 10,000 
men; three brigades in the second line, which followed 
about 200 yards in rear. Wilcox's Brigade, posted in 
rear of the right of the attacking force, was not put in 
motion until twenty minutes later and was too late to be 
of any assistance. The attacking force numbered about 
14,300, arranged as follows: 

Brockenbrough, Davis, Pettigrew, Archer, Garnett, 
Kemper. 

Lane, Scales, Armistead, Wilcox. 

72 



"All accounts of the charge agree/' says Gen. Alex- 
ander, "that its failure began when the advance had cov- 




Charge. 



|)o-[JBLE.l>A"YS ])rV 

i IST.A.C 

Thi-rd CoRP5 
JfLCOND C0}^P3 

<^IKTH Corps 

riFTK COKPS 
JlXTIf C0RP5 



Pickett's Charge July 3. 

ered about half the distance to the Federal line. At 
that point the left flank of Pettigrew began to crumble 
away and the crumbling extended along the line to the 

73 



right as the}^ continued to advance until two-thirds of 
the line was gone." 

"Our artillery, having nearly exhausted their ammuni- 
tion in the protracted cannonade that preceded the ad- 
vance of the infantry, were unable to reply or render the 
necessary support to the attacking party," says Gen. Lee's 
report. "Owing to this fact, which was unknown to me 
when the assault took place, the enemy was enabled to 
throw a strong force of infantry against our left, already 
wavering under a concentrated fire of artillery from the 
ridge in front and from Cemetery Hill on the left. It 
finally gave way and the right, after penetrating the 
enemy's line, entered his advanced works and capturing 
some of his artillery, was attacked simultaneously in 
front and on both flanks and driven back with heavy 
loss." 

The attack on the left flank of the Confederate troops 
which all accounts agree was a largely contributing fac- 
tor in the failure of the charge has been compiled from 
the official reports by Lieut. Col. Wm. F. Fox in the fol- 
lowing narrative: 

"The two brigades on the left of Pettigrew's line — 
Davis' and Brockenbrough's — while moving forward 
across the fields received destructive flank fire before 
reaching the Emmitsburg road from the 8th Ohio, which 
had been posted in the advance position for picket duty. 
Without halting to reply these brigadese on the left 
pushed forward; but on reaching the road they again 
encountered a flank fire from the skirmishers of Wil- 
lard's Brigade under command of Capt. Armstrong 
(Samuel C. Armstrong), of the 125th New York, whose 

74 



men withdrew to the right and formed quickly there. 
Pettigrew's troops, having crossed the road, received a 
further and more disastrous enfilade from the 127th 
N^ew York, of Willard's Brigade, which Gen. Hays had 
hurried into position for this purpose. Broken and dis- 
organized by this strong flank attack, but few of the 
men on Pettigrew's left succeeded in nearing the main 
Union line." 

The valley across which the Confederate advance was 
made is about one mile wide. The surface of the ground 
is rolling, with occasional depressions, in which the ad- 
vancing troops were hidden from view at times and pro- 
tected from artillery fire in front. The Federal battery 
on Little Round Top, distant a mile or more, reopened 
with an enfilading fire that inflicted considerable loss, 
but did not delay the advace. The men promptly closed 
up the gaps and moved steadily forward. For the most 
part the Confederate artillery was silent. The main 
line of the Federal artillery reserved its fire until tlie 
enemy was within 700 yards. The clump of trees which 
was pointed out to Pickett as the place of assault was 
not opposite the position from which he started, but was 
situated a thousand yards or more to the left. Conse- 
quently his troops marched diagonally across the fields, 
and, after crossing the Emmitsburg road near the Co- 
dori house, moved by the left flank some distance, after 
which they faced to the front again. The brigade of 
Wilcox which Perry followed did not see this movement 
to the left in the smoke which had settled on the field 
and obscured the Confederate advance, but moved 
straight forward, thus making an isolated charge. 

' 75 



Eaising the charging yell, the brigades of Kemper and 
Garnett rushed on an angle in the stone wall, behind 
which were Webb's Philadelphia Brigade and Cushing's 




♦Should be Arnold's. 

Sketch in Col. N. J. Hall's Report Showing Pickett's 
^ Movement. 

76 



battery. Two regiments of Stannard's Vermont Bri- 
gade at the same time poured a fire on their right flank. 
The Confederates came together in a mass at the stone 
walL Gen. Garnett was killed. Gen. Kemper was se- 
verely wounded. Gen. Armistead pushed forward his 
men from the rear^ and, placing his hat on the point of 
his sword, sprang over the low wall. He fell, mortally 
wounded. Several hundred Confederates followed him 
over the wall, and the Confederate colors waved within 
the Federal lines. But Federal troops promptly came 
up, until the men were massed four deep about the dar- 
ing Confederates. In swift succession the Confederate 
flags went down, while those who had not crossed the 
wall turned in quick retreat. 

The assault had failed, and a loud cheer rang along 
the Federal lines as the Confederate columns fell back in 
haste over the field over which they had just charged. 
Pickett's three brigades lost 2,888 out of 4,000 engaged. 
The losses in Pettigrew's and Trimble's commands are 
not known. The isolated charge by Perry's and Wil- 
cox's brigades lost 259 men out of 1,600 before the men 
turned in flight. 

"Pickett was overwhelmed, not by troops in front," 
says Col. Wm. Allan, C. S. A., in "Battles and Leaders," 
"but by those on his flanks, especially by those on his 
right flank where Wilcox was sent forward too late to be 
of use and where he was too weak to have effected much 
at best." 

Years after the war, when Lee was the target of criti- 
cism for ordering Pickett's charge against the Federal 
center, he was not disposed to shirk the responsibility 

77 



for the movement. He admitted that he had conceived 
and ordered it. Pickett^s Division was composed of 
fresh troops. Not a man of them had been engaged in 
the fighting of the previous two days. Lee did not con- 
sider that Longstreet's assaults on the left of the Fed- 
eral line on the previous day had been a failure. He 
had not accomplished all that had been intended and 
desijed, but Lee believed that he had inflicted a blow 
upon the Federal ai*my, which had only to be vigorously 
followed up to result in victory. He was persuaded in 
his own mind that Pickett's fresh troops could easily 
penetrate Meade's center, cutting the Army of the Po- 
tomac in two and insuring its defeat. He ordered the 
movement in good faith, looking for satisfactory results. 
That Pickett did actually penetrate the Federal center 
Gen. Lee looked upon as confirming his judgment in 
ordering the assault. Had the orders for Pickett's sup- 
port which he had issued been as faithfully carried into 
executioa as was the main charge, he thought the result 
might have been materially different. 

Ool. Walter H. Taylor, Adj. Gen. on Gen. Lee's staff, 
writes in ^'Southern Historical Papers": 

"The attack was not made as designed : Pickett's Di- 
vision, Hetli's Division and two brigades of Pender's Di- 
vision advanced. Hood and McLaws were not moved 
foi-ward. There were nine divisions in the army; seven 
wei-e quiet, while two assailed the fortified line of the 
enemy. A. P. Hill had orders to be prepared to assist 
Loongstreet further if necessary. Anderson, who com- 
manded one of Hill's divisions, and was in readiness to 
rcjq^ond to Longstreet's call, made his dispositions to 

78 



advance, but Gen. Longstreet told him it was of no use 
— the attack had failed. Had Hood and McLaws fol- 
lowed or supported Pickett and Pettigrew and Anderson 
been advanced, the design of the Commanding General 
would have been carried out; the world would not be so 
at a loss to understand what was designed by throwing 
forward unsupported against the enemy's stronghold so 
small a portion of our army." 

Col. A. L. Long writes in his '^Memoirs of Gen. Lee" : 

"The author can add his testimony to that of Col. 
Taylor. The original intention of Gen. Lee was that 
Pickett's attack should be supported by the divisions of 
McLaws and Hood and General Longstreet was so or- 
dered. This order was given verbally by Gen. Lee in the 
presence of Col. Long and Major Yenable, of his staff, 
and other officers of the army." 

Gen. Lee, in a letter to Maj. Wm. M. McDonald, wrote 
in 1868: 

"It (the battle) was commenced in the absence of cor- 
rect intelligence. It w^as continued in the effort to over- 
come the difficulties by which we were surrounded and it 
would have been gained could one determined and unit- 
ed blow have been delivered by our whole line." 

Lieut. Col. Wm. F. Fox in his critical remarks on the 
repulse of Pickett sa^^s: 

"Tjongstreet's assault on the third day had some slight 
semblance of success when Armistead and his men cross- 
ed the wall — ^just enough to divert attention from the 
utter hopelessness of the attempt and relieve the affair 
from the odium of an inexcusable error. But this slight 
success of the Confederate? would not have been possible 

79 



but for the mistake in placing a battery on the front 
line at the angle. It was through this opening — and at 
no other place — that an entrance was made. Had there 
been a strong force of infantry on that portion of the 
line not a Confederate would have crossed the wall. The 
storm of bullets would have beaten them back there the 
same as at every other point of the line." 

Later an attack was made on the right of the Confed- 
erate line by Farnsworth's and Merritt's brigades of cav- 
alry. The ground was wholly unsuited for cavalry and 
the attack was a sacrifice. Farnsworth was killed. There 
soon followed;, however, an infantry charge that was 
more effective. Gen. Alexander claims that the attack 
was made during the process of withdrawal of troops of 
Hood and McLaws which had been ordered by Long- 
street who felt that his right was too far advanced. The 
collision was brought about, he says, by a mistake in 
marching the 15th Georgia to the front when it had been 
ordered to the rear. 

The Pennsylvania Reserves, who had driven back the 
Confederates the day before, were ordered to clear the 
woods about Devil's Den and the wheat field. Two bri- 
gades from the 6th Corps were sent to support them. 
The troops at 5.30 p. m. opened their charge, which was 
entirely successful, the Confederates retreating to Semi- 
nary Ridge, and the battle of Gettysburg was over. 

While Pickett's charge was being made a battle was 
taking place between parts of cavalry corps of both 
armies on the Rummel farm, about three miles east of 
Gettysburg. The mounted troops of Gregg and Stuart 
were guarding respectively the right and left flanks of 

8o 



the two armies. Stuart had about 6,000 men, Gregg 
about 5,000. Stuart was detected in a movement to 
gain position to attack the Federal rear, and a fight fol- 
lowed. Brilliant dashes were made by regiments from 
both sides and there were many hand-to-hand contests. 
Gen. Wade Hampton, of the Confederates, received a 
severe wound. Both sides used artillery. At 5 o'clock 
each abandoned offensive operations. At evening Stu- 
art withdrew. 

Lee saw the necessity for immediate retreat. In his 
official report he said that owing to the strength of the 
enemy's position and the reduction of their own ammu- 
nition, they could not renew the engagement. The dif- 
ficulties of obtaining supplies made it impossible for 
them to stay where they were. Consequently he remain- 
ed on the field only during the 4th and retired at night, 
having first sent back his wagon trains and wounded. 
Gen. Meade called a council of war, which unanimously 
Toted against an attack on the Confederates, and it was 
determined to remain in position and await the develop- 
ment of Lee's plans. Meanwhile the latter had begun 
to fall back. A severe storm came up and amid almost 
blinding rain the defated Confederates pressed on 
through the mud to the Potomac, which the army finally 
crossed on the 13th and 14th, returning to Virginia. 

"Gettysburg was the greatest, grandest battle of the 
war," says Lieut. Col. Wm. F. Fox. "And yet the vic- 
tory won there was not a decisive one. It was but a re- 
petition of Antietam, with this difference only, that the 
Confederacy was one year nearer the end of its resources, 
one year nearer the inevitable." 

8i 



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